


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18 January 1984

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

CONTENTS

ANGOLA

Radio Cites Worldwide Condemnation of RSA (Luanda Domestic Service, 8 Jan 83)	1
Briefs	
SRV Sends Solidarity Message	2
Jorge Meets British, Other Envoys	2

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Briefs	
Bokassa Wants To Return	3

GABON

Results of French Journalist's Disclosures About Bongo Noted (Martin Bennitt; AFRICA NOW, Dec 83)	4
--	---

GAMBIA

Profiteers, Rice Smugglers Reportedly Damaging Nation's Economy (THE GAMBIA TIMES, 10 Dec 83)	8
--	---

GHANA

AFP Views Country's Economic Situation (AFP, 29 Dec 83)	13
--	----

MAURITIUS

New Alliance Government Will Reportedly 'Brook No Nonsense' (AFRICA NOW, No 31, Nov 83)	16
--	----

MOZAMBIQUE

Machel Stresses Need for U.S. Aid (Samora Machel Interview; LE VIF, 1 Dec 83)	18
--	----

Central Region Officials Meet in Manica District (Maputo Domestic Service, 5 Jan 84)	21
Friendship Group Scores U.S. Nuclear Missiles (Maputo Domestic Service, 5 Jan 84)	22
Commentary Scores National Resistance Activities (Maputo in English to Southern Africa, 5 Jan 84)	23
Briefs	
Local Militias Strengthened	24
Envoy Visits Macau	24
Vietnamese Envoy Cites Support	24
SA Refugees Wounded in Blast	25
British Drought Aid	25
NAMIBIA	
Multi-Party Group: Independence Nowhere in Sight (THE CITIZEN, 15 Nov 83)	26
Security Police Fear Infiltration by SWAPO (THE STAR, 1 Nov 83)	27
Columnist Urges Calling South Africa's Bluff (Gwen Lister; WINDHOEK OBSERVER, 10 Dec 83)	28
Army, Constables Accidentally Fight, Kill Two (THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER, 7 Dec 83)	31
Population Statistics for Windhoek Provided (THE STAR, 14 Dec 83)	32
Nujoma: SA Recruiting Mercenaries for 'Murder Squad' (THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER, 12 Dec 83)	33
Tsumeb Corporation To Close Copper Mine (THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER, 8 Dec 83)	34
Investigation of Mining Industry Called For (Editorial; WINDHOEK OBSERVER, 10 Dec 83)	35
Briefs	
'Orgy' of Murders	37
'Bitter' Reaction to Detention	37
Inquiry Into Security Soon	37
NIGER	
Tahoua Agricultural Production Project Explained (SAHEL HEBDO, 5 Dec 83)	39
Briefs	
Kountche New Year Message	43

NIGERIA

Speculation Said Rife as to Motives Behind Gowon Visit (AFRICA NOW, No 32, Dec 83)	44
---	----

SOUTH AFRICA

Editorial Comment on Foreign, Domestic Topics (Editorial; various sources, various dates)	46
--	----

New PFP Policy
New White Paper on Education
Border Area Conflict Potential
Relations With Mauritius
Relations With Taipei
U.S. Government Attitude

Bishop Tutu Predicts Bleak Year of Confrontation Ahead (Sam Mabe; SOWETAN, 29 Dec 83)	52
--	----

UNITA Success Puts Luanda 'In Serious Trouble' (Johannesburg Domestic Service, 6 Jan 83)	53
---	----

Road to 'Different Kind' of Afrikanerdom Viewed (Various sources, various dates)	55
---	----

Direction of Afrikanerdom, by Willie Kuhn
Interview With Buthelezi, by Pieter Cronje
English Community Following the Referendum,
by Lawrence Schlemmer
On Future Role of Colored, by Gus Adams

Briefs Agricultural Land to Black Homelands	66
--	----

UGANDA

Various Difficulties Said Leading to Anarchy (AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, No 22, 2 Nov 83)	67
--	----

Former Official Reportedly Flees for His Life (Richard Carver; AFRICA NOW, No 31, Nov 83)	73
--	----

Government To Reduce External Debt Arrears (Peter Masebu; UGANDA TIMES, 21 Nov 83)	76
---	----

Steps Taken To Rehabilitate Ailing Water System (AFRICA NOW, No 31, Nov 83)	78
--	----

Diversifying Exports To Reduce Dependence on Coffee (J. Ochieng; UGANDA TIMES, 18 Nov 83)	79
--	----

UPPER VOLTA

AFP Views Country's 'Deteriorating' Economic Situation (Philippe Mudry; AFP, 11 Dec 83)	81
--	----

ZAMBIA

ZNUT Branch Accuses Labor Ministry of Causing Confusion (DAILY MAIL, 14 Dec 83)	83
--	----

Mutale Says Government Should Stress Growing Group of Indigenous Crops (DAILY MAIL, 14 Dec 83)	85
--	----

Consumers Seek Revocation of ROP Products' Price Increases (TIMES OF ZAMBIA, 15 Dec 83)	87
--	----

Angolan Refugees Being Airlifted From Ndola Airport to Luanda (TIMES OF ZAMBIA, 13 Dec 83)	89
---	----

Kamanga Charges LDS Has Failed To Deliver Services to Farmers (TIMES OF ZAMBIA, 15 Dec 83)	90
---	----

SIDO To Help Businessmen Obtain Commercial Bank Loans (DAILY MAIL, 13 Dec 83)	92
--	----

ZIMBABWE

Minister Inspects Restructuring Exercise (Harare Domestic Service, 5 Jan 84)	93
---	----

Briefs	
Splinter Unions Urged To Merge	94
Youth, Women's Congresses Open	94

ANGOLA

RADIO CITES WORLDWIDE CONDEMNATION OF RSA

MB090833 Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese 0700 GMT 8 Jan 84

[Text] The flow of messages from every corner of the earth from different national and international organizations has not stopped. These messages are clear proof of the condemnation of mankind of the aggressive policy of the Pretoria regime against the People's Republic of Angola. We are receiving telexes that express in thousands of words the feelings of millions of people--from all around the world with different ideologies and creeds--who are effectively united in a vehement condemnation against this crime we are witnessing that goes against all individual, collective, national and international rights.

The greatest South African aim cannot be accepted by anybody, not using any type of reasoning. Their bloody and murderous claws are too much exposed and dirty to leave doubt about their true design in this escalation of aggressions against our independence and sovereignty. Pretoria's expansionism, directed at full strength against Angola, is not going to stop now. Their goals are much more ambitious. The political and military domination of the southern region of our continent is in their plans, according to the strategy laid down by the centers for the expansion of international imperialism.

Universal history is full of examples of how regional, continental and international wars started. What is happening in Angola today follows the many cases already registered by history. In the face of the threat of the generalization of this conflict--with all the drastic consequences that will naturally follow this irresponsible action by the leaders of racism--the international community must do much more, must go beyond words and the traditional condemnation notes which today only serve to amuse the South African leaders, who are unmoved by the conventional language which men use to make acquaintances and live together.

In our case, and quoting President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, the attack being carried out by the South African Army in conjunction with Angolan puppets and mercenaries from different nationalities will be met by our people with every means at our disposal.

CSO: 3442/120

BRIEFS

SRV SENDS SOLIDARITY MESSAGE--Luanda, 5 Jan (ANGOP)--The Vietnamese people and government have manifested their indignation at the arrogance of the racist South Africans, who recently intensified their attacks on the Angolan provinces of Huila, Cunene and Cuando-Kubango (southern Angola). In a message addressed to his Angolan counterpart, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach in fact reaffirmed that the warmongering activities of the apartheid regime openly violate the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola as well as international laws and at the same time constitute a challenge to the progressive community of Africa and the whole world. "It is evident that the racists of South Africa, supported and encouraged by the North American imperialists and the reactionary circles of the West, will not easily abandon their maneuvers to undermine stability in southern Africa," said Nguyen Co Thach who reiterated the solidarity and support of his government and the people of Vietnam for the revolutionary cause of the Angolan people and its armed wing, the FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola]. [Text] [AB051536 Luanda ANGOP in French 1120 GMT 5 Jan 84]

JORGE MEETS BRITISH, OTHER ENVOYS--Paulo Teixeira Jorge, the Angolan minister of foreign affairs, the day before yesterday received separately the ambassadors of Great Britain, Marrack Goulding; Czechoslovakia, Milos Vesely; and Algeria, (Jamal Haddins Yama). On the same day Comrade Paulo Jorge also received the ambassadors of Egypt, Ahmed Nabil al-Salawi; Vietnam, Ho Tu Truc; Saharan Democratic Republic, (Ammedhou Zuile); and East Timor, Roque Rodrigues. The Angolan foreign affairs minister also met the Yugoslavian and Italian charges d'affaires. During these meetings discussions were held about bilateral relations.

CSO: 3442/120

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

BOKASSA WANTS TO RETURN--At Hardricourt on Tuesday, 6 December, the former emperor told AFP that he would like to stay in France but that, in case the Government did not want him to, he did not wish to leave for "exile" again but wanted "to return to his country to stand trial." He also asserted that he no longer claimed French citizenship. Incidentally, at Bangui several former collaborators of the deposed sovereign (including Joseph Potolot, ex-minister) have been questioned for "spreading false news." Henri Dondra, president of the Association of Parents of Martyred Children (the children massacred in 1979), stated that the publicity about Bokassa's return to France is an offense against the memory of the school children who fell victim to the imperial regime. On 23 December 1980 the Criminal Court sentenced Bokassa to death in absentia. /Text/ /Paris, LE MONDE in French 8 Dec 83 p 8/ 11698

CSO: 3419/239

RESULTS OF FRENCH JOURNALIST'S DISCLOSURES ABOUT BONGO NOTED

London AFRICA NOW in English Dec 83 pp 12-14

[Article by Martin Bennitt: "Stirring Up the Mud in Gabon"]

[Text]

The deaths of some 50 French paratroops when an explosive-laden truck blew apart their barracks in Beirut went unreported in the Gabonese media, even though the similar attack which killed more than 200 US marines was fully covered.

It was not a question of the relative insignificance of the French death toll or some bizarre failure in communications. For, as the days passed, the Gabonese public began to notice a complete absence of any news whatsoever dealing with France, even, or especially, down to the league football results.

The Gabonese were not the only ones to suffer. One of Africa's most powerful radio stations, *Africa Number One*, in which the French Government has a considerable stake, can reach practically every Francophone country in Africa. But it is based in Libreville, the Gabonese capital and, like the Gabonese Press, domestic radio and television, it relegated France to official oblivion.

The Gabonese were given no explanation for this curious state of affairs, for they cannot fail to have noticed something unusual. The government did not consider it was bound to provide one, yet the government was undoubtedly behind this censorship — and in Gabon the government means President Omar Bongo.

Bongo was taking petty revenge for a book which had just been published in Paris, in spite of his best efforts to prevent it appearing. Entitled *Affaires Africaines**, something of a misnomer since it dealt almost exclusively with Gabon, it was written by French journalist Pierre Péan.

Péan (45) once worked in Gabon as part of the French aid programme. Apart from Africa, his other speciality is oil and, in Gabon, the two are intimately linked

through the French Elf Company. In fact, his book's 340 pages reveal little that was not known before, but it collates the whole history of French-Gabonese relations, backed up with copies of documents, to bring everything into perspective, resurrect scandals which were thought to be buried, and draw some very interesting conclusions.

Péan's thesis is simple: that Omar Bongo, considered at the beginning to be a useful tool by the French, and notably by what the author calls the "*clan des Gabonais*," has risen to head that clan, thanks to his own abilities and also his intimate knowledge of the French political system and France's traditional concern for influence in Africa. The only alternative to a direct confrontation between Paris and Libreville is for the Mitterrand government to play the same game in Gabon as its predecessors.

Mitterrand, however, appears so far to have more scruples than De Gaulle, Pompidou or Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. He failed to ban Péan's book, as previous regimes had prevented the publication of criticism of Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Ahmed Sekou Touré of Guinea. Admittedly those earlier governments could quote an 1881 law against works "of foreign origin" (written respectively by Cameroonian Mongo Beti, Belgian Jules Chome and Frenchman-naturalised-Guinean Jean-Paul Alata), whereas Péan is French, but the latter said he was not approached in any way by the Elysée Palace over his book.

The pressure instead came from Libreville: at first friendly approaches, then offers of money and finally blackmail. Péan was told that a friend of his, former Minister Jean-Marc Ekoh, now in prison

for advocating a multi-party system in Gabon, would have his sentence increased. Other political prisoners, supporters of the outlawed *Mouvement de Redressement National* (MORENA), would not have their sentences lightened, as Bongo had promised to Mitterrand at the beginning of this year. At the same time the Elysée was heavily lobbied by an alarmed Bongo, but to no avail. French Government opinion was that the affair was a storm in a teacup, but it could yet turn out to be wrong.

For *Affaires Africaines* stirs up some very deep mud, which could have repercussions just as much in Paris as in Libreville, where it will never be read as long as Bongo is in power. Much of it is now history, but "*plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.*"

Firmly in the past now, for example, are the Biafran and Rhodesian rebellions. Libreville was a key centre for the support of both.

In the first case, Bongo was given a *fait accompli*. Charles De Gaulle, jealous of Nigeria's potential, had been helping Ojukwu through Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast and Leon M'ba of Gabon before Bongo, the postal clerk groomed as successor by Paris, took over on the death of M'ba in November 1967. Six months later he recognised Biafra. Aircraft, weapons, supplies and mercenaries paid for by France were channelled through Libreville. The head of the operation, recruited by De Gaulle's notorious African specialist, Jacques Foccart, was Rhodesian Jack Malloch.

French aid for Biafra, which in any case was not going to be enough, ended in 1969 with the arrival of Georges Pompidou at the Elysée, but Jack Malloch stayed on in Libreville. In 1970 he set up Affretair, the highly successful sanctions-busting airline which did much to keep the Rhodesian rebellion going. Foreign governments closed their eyes to what was going on and, not least, the Gabonese. When Affretair's cover was finally blown, Air Gabon was set up to do its job, notably in helping Rhodesian beef find a market abroad. Among the major beneficiaries of the traffic were members of the Clan Gabonais.

In all this, Bongo, who was only 32 when he came to power, was more or less guided by Foccart, as well as the French secret service, known as the SDECE, and the French settlers in Gabon who made up the *clan Gabonais*. But in 1974 the price of oil began to rise and Gabon suddenly became a very wealthy country. Bongo's fingers were well in the pie and he began to exert his new-found authority.

Péan's research has shown that Bongo, his family and his closest collaborators, such as Deputy Prime Minister Georges Rawiri and Oil Minister Alexis M'bouy-M'Boutzit, are the major shareholders in all Gabon's principal companies. Most importantly, a substantial

stake in Elf-Gabon, linked with preferential treatment for the parent company over prices, gives Bongo great influence over one of the main motors of the French economy. The Gabonese villager, on the other hand, is little better off than he was in the days of Doctor Schweitzer.

"The desire to cream off the wealth of the country appears an obsession for some leading figures," Péan writes. "Embezzlement of public assets is continuous. Every activity, every contract is subject to a rake-off. Even the Gabonese embassy in Paris belongs to Rawiri and Bongo and the Foreign Ministry is thought to pay a very large rent to Gabon's two principal leaders."

Of course, the larger the contract the bigger the cut, and Gabon has not been short of prestigious projects which also inflate Bongo's standing. They range from *Africa Number One* radio station to the Presidential Palace and the largest undertaking in the whole continent, the Transgabonese Railway.

The Presidential Palace, part of the preparations for the 1977 Libreville summit, cost at least 78bn CFA francs and was built so quickly and so badly it needed complete renovation only three years after its completion. All the projects connected with the summit are estimated to have cost 600bn CFA francs and effectively bankrupted the country. The International Monetary Fund moved in and put the screws on, but it did not stop Bongo's pet scheme, the Transgabonese Railway.

This railway is officially to give access to the vast iron deposits at Belinga and make possible the exploitation of large tracts of forest. It is partly financed by Arab money, after Bongo was converted to Islam. However, current low commodity prices will not make the line profitable and Péan ascribes a political motive to its construction.

For the line's eastern terminus will be at Franceville, capital of Bongo's own province of Haut-Ogooue, populated by the Bateke people, who also live over the border in the Congo and have traditionally looked east. At an estimated cost of 500bn CFA francs, not counting "commissions," the Transgabonese Railway would induce not only the Gabonese Batekes but also the Congolese to look West. If many of them moved across the border it would make Bongo feel safer in the face of the more numerous Fangs.

Politically, of course, Bongo is highly conservative and authoritarian. He has always been willing to help similar rulers in Africa, such as King Hassan of Morocco and Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, as well as interfering in Angola's oil enclave of Gabinda. It was at the request of Eyadema that he helped mount the farcical operation by mercenary Bob Denard in January 1977 against Togo's Marxist neighbour, Benin.

although he has always denied being involved, in spite of the evidence of numerous documents. These show, for example, that Bongo's Bank, based in Luxembourg, put up the money, and Affretair supplied the aircraft. The coup attempt was a complete flop, but Denard stayed on in Gabon as a technical adviser to Bongo before he had better luck in the Comoros, where he now wields great influence after leading Ahmed Abdallah's coup against Ali Soilih in 1978. Only three years' before, Denard had done exactly the opposite.

Characterwise, Bongo is highly sensitive to any imputation that he is less than perfect and this sensitivity, exemplified in his attitude to Pèan's book and the great publicity given to it by the French media, extends to his personal life. But it is just this aspect, namely the behaviour of his wife Marie-Josephine, which provides the most incredible but no less authentic incident: the Luong affair.

"Marie-Jo" has been less than faithful to Bongo on more than one occasion and her rumoured lovers, not to mention a previous husband, have met violent ends. A Haitian, Rene Joseph, was hunted down in Miami by Denard's men. But Marie-Josephine's family are also rich and influential and a break with them could be disastrous for Bongo.

In September 1978, Marie-Jo was attracted to Robert Luong, a housepainter who had been doing work on the Presidential Palace. Their affair came to Bongo's ears and in January 1979 Luong was deported from Gabon to France aboard the Presidential jet escorted by two members of the Presidential guard. They told French police that they had orders to watch Luong at his home in southern France and prevent him from going to Paris. On orders from above, the police complied.

But Luong "escaped" more than once and met Marie-Jo in a Paris hotel, where they were surprised by Bongo himself. The two lovers were not to see each other again and letters and telephone calls from Luong went unanswered.

On October 26 1979, Luong, still under strict surveillance, went again to Paris. He did not see Marie-Jo, but on his return home he was shot dead outside his apartment block. Police investigations were less than thorough, key potential witnesses were not questioned and the case was virtually dropped.

There was no doubt that Valéry Giscard d'Estaing valued France's links with Gabon just as much as De Gaulle and Pompidou, under the strong influence of the *clan Gabonais*, which now included his own "Foccart," René Journiac. In February 1980, Journiac himself was killed when Bongo's private aircraft, on which he was the only passenger, crashed mysteriously in northern Cameroon.

The Luong Affair was reopened when Mitterrand came to power, but without much enthusiasm. The case only continued under the impulse of lawyers for Luong's family, but in February 1983, Pèan reveals, Luong's wife was paid a million francs by "friends of Gabon" to drop her interest in the proceedings.

In effect, according to Pèan, Mitterrand's arrival has changed little. Bongo, in the centre of a spider's web of vested interests, gave funds to all three parties in the 1981 French elections and is still in the driving seat. The threat he now hangs over the Elysée is to invite the Americans into France's private commercial and military preserve. The publication of *Affaires Africaines* could lead him to take that step anyway.

Pèan himself is convinced that this is what will happen and Bongo has himself made approaches to Washington since his book appeared. For Bongo—who pointedly met Ronald Reagan (though he denied discussing a military agreement) in Washington in June 1981, a month after Mitterrand's election and before he saw the new French President in Paris — "the special relationship between Gabon and France no longer exists, and the *Affaires Africaines* is the reason," Pèan told *Africa Now*.

A joint communiqué after last month's visit of Chester Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, stressed the desire of Washington and Libreville to strengthen their political, cultural, economic and commercial relations and there were predictions in the Gabonese capital of a formal aid agreement by the end of the year.

The Elysée, which played down the likely effect of Pèan's book before it appeared, is now extremely worried, as is Elf-Aquitaine. A personal friend and adviser of Mitterrand, lawyer Roland Dumas, spent two days in Libreville at the end of October trying to persuade Bongo to lift his media sanctions.

He failed. But the French, obviously alarmed, were not giving up easily. As the boycott of French news continued it was revealed that François de Grossouvre, known as Mitterrand's *eminence grise*, was going to Gabon. His task was evidently to succeed where Dumas had failed.

"Because the book was not banned, Bongo considers he has been betrayed by France," Pèan said. He would not be surprised to see other sanctions, such as the cancellation of contracts, follow. Personally, as a professional journalist, he feels no remorse about bringing the book out, but its enormous success (it was into its fifth printing three weeks after publication) has astonished him.

"Bongo is his own worst publicity agent. If he hadn't made such a fuss fewer people would have been interested," he told *Africa Now*.

But, remembering the fate of Luong and others, does he not feel somewhat nervous? "I hope that I will not have cause to be afraid," he said. "There was a lot of pressure from Libreville beforehand, starting with appeals to reason and going on to offers of money and then the blackmail over Jean-Marc Ekoh. But I was not threatened personally and up to now, as far as I know, sentences against Ekoh and other MORENA imprisoned members have not been extended."

In fact, *Affaires Africaines* was originally going to be a review of the whole gamut of Franco-African relations, but the Gabonese chapter turned out to be a book in itself. But Pèan is not thinking of a sequel just yet. "I've stirred up such a hornets' nest with this book, I'm leaving Africa alone for a bit," he said ●

CSO: 3400/440

PROFITEERS, RICE SMUGGLERS REPORTEDLY DAMAGING NATION'S ECONOMY

Banjul THE GAMBIA TIMES in English 10 Dec 83 pp 1, 2

[Text]

We are today calling for a new level of awareness for the militant. We are asking for a stronger resolve, a higher degree of vigilance and a greater sense of commitment in the protection and promotion of our national interest against the material interest of a few greedy operators the outcome of whose machinations can, in the long run, only spell doom to this country's economic well-being and social fabric.

There is being imposed on our population a great deal of unnecessary hardship at too frequent an interval through the activities of this group of clandestine operators for profit. In the process, what they end up doing is not only to impose hardship on the Gambian people time and time again, but also help ruin the very foundations of The Gambian economy. They therefore must not only be watched, but must be exposed, neutralised and eventually eliminated for the scourge they are to our lives and to the life of our nation.

Here of course, we are talking about none other than the people who help bring about shortages of our essential commodities especially rice. By their action, they make meaningless the well disposed action of our Government in ensuring that the people of The Gambia shall never go hungry, in guaranteeing for all our peoples at all times and in every corner of this country, fair and reasonable prices for all imports but especially foodstuffs like rice. This basic

point of departure for the liberal policies of a democratic state is, as stated earlier, being put to the most severe tests imaginable because of the machinations and profiteering activities of just a few people, and the considerable numbers of others, who have been serving, knowingly and unknowingly, as their collaborators and accomplices.

For our militants to better appreciate the importance of the point being made, we wish to digress a bit on the situation as a whole. The Gambia, like all countries of Africa, is in the category of the developing world. In fact, it is listed as an *Ldc* which means least developed countries. Such being the case, it is no surprise to note that the basis of our economy is predominantly agricultural. In our case, this has meant the production of groundnuts. The other economic crops for export, like cotton, livestock, fisheries and even tourism are mere adjuncts to what groundnuts bring to the benefit of our economy.

But, as everyone knows, groundnuts do not always, if ever they did, enjoy premium price levels on the world market. Consequently, this puts The Gambia, along with other similarly placed countries in Africa and all over the world, at the mercy of world market price fluctuations. Thus, even were one to have a bumper harvest, the outcome can be nullified or seriously compromised by low market prices. That apart, there is even the other less predictable question to contend with, namely climatic and ecological factors. It can be a problem of drought, of too much rain, of late rains, of uneven rainfall, of unseasonal rains or of insect infestations or crop disease.

It is only after contending with all these factors and coming up in the end with whatever little produce can be brought together overall, that the people of The Gambia, through their government, eventually receive from the buyers of their crops payments which enable them to buy goods from abroad

and bring these here for the use of the people and their government. It is true of course that there are other sources of funding which may be available to supplement this main source of foreign exchange, ie. from aid (loans and grants), remittances from Gambian nationals from abroad, and injections of such funds from private commercial groupings and non-governmental philanthropic organisations operating in this country. The needs of this country for consumer and capital goods have increased several fold especially with the onset of full-fledged development planning and the resultant changing consumer consumption patterns throughout the country. But the loans and the various imports have all to be repaid in the reverse direction in precious currency.

One can therefore see why this item, in the aftermath of recent crop failures and low world market prices, as well as the crunch from the international sources of finance and aid, because of world-wide recession and high interest rates in world capital markets, has increasingly become scarce. It has therefore become of paramount importance to conserve our foreign exchange holdings in the interest of all our people. Certain things are basic. Loans have to be repaid in foreign exchange. Food imports have to be paid for, also in foreign exchange. So also the various sundry goods and capital items, which have to be paid with this same precious foreign exchange.

Under these circumstances, one has to recognise our leaders' injunction to cut our coats according to our size. But that is the problem. Because of the activities of a few operators and their collaborators, our country may not have been cutting its coat according to its size. In fact, what is known as the deterioration in the terms of trade, which means that we are paying more for manufactured goods we import and receiving, at an ever increasing rate, less and less in comparative terms for the export of our primary produce, has also contributed to this situation. There is an imbalance and the imbalance is ever increa-

sing. The balance of international trade is not in our favour. At any moment in time, we are now importing more than we have foreign exchange to pay for.

All this affects our credit worthiness as a nation. For no sane person will lend you money or goods which should be paid in foreign exchange if he has indications that you are having trouble discharging your debt obligations to the international trading or financial community. There is therefore no lack of reasons as to why every care must be taken not to fritter away this precious foreign exchange which we get from our exports and other sources already named. For if due care is not taken and we totally run out of foreign exchange, we will be in the position of countries which have no food for their peoples, where starvation is the order of the day, and where prices of commodities on the local markets go up astronomically.

Yet this notwithstanding, there are those who take the rice and other foodstuff bought with this precious foreign exchange for our people, spirit the goods in question across our difficult-to-police borders, to sell at astronomical profits in the neighbouring countries where the price of such goods are far higher than they are in this liberal democratic trading nation of ours.

Militants therefore have to note the situation as a whole and judge it fully in its perspective. Failing this will not be doing justice to the importance of the subject at hand. Failing to do so will be to fail our Gambian people time and time again. It will mean so while our government continues in its responsible undertaking of bringing in more and more rice at the expense of other needed imports, such as medicines, school materials, agricultural implements, fuel and general goods, in order to ensure our people do not lack or starve. The great disadvantage of this situation is that other imports can suffer: we can get further behind in the discharge of debt obligations, be this commercial or official;

goods and imports can become more and more difficult to purchase from overseas because of lack of the foreign exchange, foreign exchange, which would have been spent mainly to import rice again and again and, which is the only means of overseas purchase for us.

What is at stake is therefore a national challenge. It is our very national survival. It is true citizenship and a patriotic duty.

Militants, help the nation expose the selfish profiteers who sell the people's rice, to other countries. Your economic saboteurs can also be your neighbour and friends.

CSO: 3400/472

AFP VIEWS COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION

AB291700 Paris AFP in English 1512 GMT 29 Dec 83

[Excerpts] Accra, 29 December (AFP)--Two years after it took power on New Year's Eve 1981, Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings' "Revolutionary People's" regime has come to terms with economic reality, backed by Western countries and the International Monetary Fund, in a pragmatic attempt to drag Ghana out of a chaos which has lasted 10 years.

In toppling President Hilla Limann, to whom he had handed over power little more than 2 years before after a brief military "house-cleaning exercise," Flight-Lieutenant Rawlings declared war again on corruption and the politicians he blamed for the country's bankruptcy.

These upheavals were accompanied by calls on the population to denounce the "profiteers" of the old regime and a ban on political parties, leading to the flight abroad of a great part of the skilled and professional people which Ghana so lacks today, when its economic situation has never been worse.

All these refugees, in particular several thousand teachers, settled mainly in the surrounding English-speaking countries, such as Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone, while others went to London, which with Lagos, became the centre of opposition to the Rawlings regime.

For Rawlings' return failed to improve the catastrophic economic situation he inherited, and in 2 years he was to face five attempted coups. Galloping inflation and increasing difficulty in finding ordinary consumer goods--tooth-paste, electric light bulbs and motor [word indistinct] are all currently unobtainable in Accra--did not make his regime very popular.

On top of his problems came a lengthy drought affecting the whole region's agriculture. In 1984 the projected food deficit is 450,000 tons of cereals, which will be made up (?by) international aid (120,000 tons) and the government scraping the bottom of its foreign exchange barrel (for 300,000 tons).

The drought has also caused unprecedented bush fires which have ravaged the already aging cocoa plantations, bringing production down to less than 160,000 tons. In 1981 it was 255,000 tons, and in 1965, when Ghana led the world in cocoa output, 566,000 tons.

As cocoa provides 70 percent of Ghana's export revenue, this plunge has only made things worse. The balance of payments deficit this year is expected to reach 240 million dollars on a total budget of 1.2 billion, and it is the lack of foreign currency to buy essential equipment which prevents the factories from producing to capacity.

For instance there are 37 car and truck assembly plants which have not turned out a single vehicle since 1978. It is estimated that factories are only making between 15 and 20 percent of their potential, and even this is expected to drop rapidly following a cut in electricity output from the powerful Akosomk Dam because of the drought.

Since 1 December consumers, including industry, have had power only every other day.

Flight-Lieutenant Rawlings' awareness finally that revolutionary slogans would not rebuild the country, and that he must take even the harshest reality into account, made him decide after 18 months in power that "shock treatment" could not be avoided.

His frequent warnings that national recovery required "blood, sweat, and tears" were put into effect in the 1983 budget, delivered 6 months late at the end of May.

Finance and Economy Minister Kwesi Botchwey announced price rises of up to 1,000 percent (for international air fares). Other products, such as cloth, matches, beer and cigarettes, would go up by between 300 and 500 percent.

This initial "turn of the screw" certainly gave a shock to Ghanaians, even though the minimum daily wage was almost doubled. Trade unions and the press spoke of "strangulation" of the working classes.

But such measures could only please Western sources of credit, notably the United States--which in June was accused of backing a mercenary landing to overthrow the regime--and the International Monetary Fund.

A devaluation of the currency, the cedi, by 1,090 percent in October, accompanied by a new spate of price rises--petrol tripled in cost--enabled Ghana to obtain 150 million dollars for 1984 from creditors meeting in Paris.

This sum will be devoted essentially to improving transport by repairing roads and importing spare parts for trucks, renovating the cocoa industry, buying fertiliser and helping the gold and manganese mines.

Western diplomats are openly pleased that Ghana has undertaken a sort of "re-conversion" after the euphoria of revolution, and contacts with Libya which were a bit too close for comfort.

One business man here commented that Ghanaians were realising more and more that aid from socialist countries was more verbal than real, while Western countries brought substantial economic help with fewer conditions attached.

However, political and financial circles here stress that, while the measures adopted to redress the situation might be courageous, and even politically dangerous for the regime, they will have positive and lasting effects only in the long term.

The departure of a great number of skilled people because of the regime's policies after the revolution threatens to be a major handicap for the 3-year recovery programme, it was pointed out.

"They are not going to return to Ghana to tighten their belts, and still less to refloat a regime which brought about their losses," one source remarked.

The low salaries being paid in Ghana will also not encourage them to return. A top civil servant earns between 1,000 and 1,500 cedis a month, or between 7 and 10 dollars at the black market rate of exchange.

The massive devaluation of the cedi has had no effect on the parallel market, where the dollar buys 150 cedis compared with 30 at the official rate.

As a result, administrative offices are regularly empty, as their occupants try to supplement their income with another job or in clandestine dealings.

It is a practice which Flight-Lieutenant Rawlings' "holy war on corruption" has not been able to eradicate.

Ghana's creditors are to meet again at the end of 1984 to decide if they will provide another 250 million dollars for 1985, and 300 million for 1986.

CSO: 3400/477

NEW ALLIANCE GOVERNMENT WILL REPORTEDLY 'BROOK NO NONSENSE'

London AFRICA NOW in English No 31, Nov 83 p 25

[Text]

The warning has already gone out to the opposition Mauritius Militant Movement (MMM) (especially its leader, Paul Béranger) and the trade unions: the new Alliance government in Mauritius intends to brook no nonsense from its opponents during its next five years in power.

The government of Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth hopes that if there is peace and stability, Mauritius will recover from the doldrums it has now found itself in. Jugnauth has therefore made it clear that he would not tolerate illegal strikes. This brings to mind the strikes of 1971, 1974 and 1979/80 which Paul Béranger and the MMM used as a base to oust the government of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam in the elections of June 1982.

The Prime Minister believes such strikes will hamper Mauritius' much-needed recovery. Therefore, to offset any state of confrontation between employers and employees, the latter will be encouraged to take more part in the day-to-day decision-making process in their places of employment. The trade unions, at the same time, will be called upon to instill in their members the need for order, discipline and increased productivity.

Jugnauth said the people had given his government a stable political platform (through the overwhelming vote for the Alliance) to rule for the next five years. "What the country needs now is industrial peace which should lead to further industrialisation and investment," the Prime Minister said.

In the past, attempts have been made to isolate the private sector. But Jugnauth is all for wooing this sector. He said: "In a free country, the private sector has a decisive role to play."

To the electorate, Jugnauth warned: "The population must reject the demagogic strategy of the opposition. Workers should not be used to defend or promote any political ideology.

Everything should be done to protect democracy and the people's freedom."

But Béranger was not impressed. "The government has not mentioned that it really wants national reconciliation. The country is divided into two and the government intends isolating the opposition. This would not work," he said.

He went on: "If the government continues its policy of the stick and the carrot to get the support of the yes men, soon there wouldn't be enough carrots to satisfy everyone. If the government wants co-operation from the opposition, it should change its tone."

On the part of the trade unions, they want to consolidate the gains they have made during the last three years. Since Béranger left the unions there has not been a strong leader of the workers. Now the leaders of the *Front Syndical de Gauche* (FSG) and the MMM-affiliated General Workers Federation (GWF), the leading member of the FSG, have asked Béranger to play a prominent role in bringing about a strong labour movement to fight for better conditions for workers in the sugar estates, one of the largest employers of labour in Mauritius.

Meanwhile, there is a heated debate going on within the Alliance on the form it should take. It has been proposed that the Social Democratic Party of Mauritius (PMSD) and the Labour Party of Sir Seewoosagur be dissolved and their members join the Mauritius Socialist Movement (MSM). Sir Seewoosagur is all for this, but Economic Planning Minister Boollel is opposed to such a proposal because he hopes to become leader of the Labour Party next month when Sir Seewoosagur becomes President of Republican Mauritius.

There was also strong condemnation from Labour stalwart J.B. David. He believed that the party was still relevant today. "It represents the symbol of

workers' freedom and independence. Forty years of history cannot be buried in one stroke," David said, adding that the party had its part to play in the government, and it would play it effectively.

"The Labour Party made a tactical error by accepting to be third in the Alliance instead of leading the group. The Labour Party was responsible for the Alliance's tremendous success," according to David.

His views are shared by many members of the Labour Party who have instead suggested that the MSM dissolves and its members join Labour. If the debate continues, it will then be difficult for the government to carry out its threat of dealing heavy-handedly with those involved in "anti-democratic or anti-patriotic" actions ●

CSO: 3400/424

MACHEL STRESSES NEED FOR U.S. AID

Brussels LE VIF in French 1 Dec 83 p 72

/Interview with Samora Machel, president of Mozambique, no date given/

/Text/ Plunged into a latent war against South Africa, Samora Machel's revolutionary Mozambique, backed by the Soviets, now appeals to the West. We met with him.

Samora Machel has been president of Mozambique since 1975, in other words since this former Portuguese colony achieved independence. His government is Marxist and has links to the Soviet Union but still describes itself as "nonaligned."

Recently President Machel visited six European countries, seeking to obtain economic and military aid.

/Question/ What can Mozambique do to defend itself against the South African commando raids on the offices of the African National Congress in Maputo?

/Answer/ What will the United States do to allow Mozambique to resist these aggressions? And, considering the diplomatic, economic and military relations the United States entertains with the Union of South Africa, what could it do to prevent these attacks?

/Question/ What do you expect from the United States?

/Answer/ In order to resist, my people must be armed.

/Question/ Is the antigovernment guerrilla movement in Mozambique getting more powerful?

/Answer/ There are no guerrillas in our country, only armed bandits.

/Question/ Is the level of Soviet economic and military aid inadequate?

/Answer/ During the years of our struggle for the liberation of Mozambique, we enjoyed the total support of the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and East Germany. Not only by way of arms supplies but just as much by

training for our cadres. On the other hand, I have never received weapons from the West, not even diplomatic support. I am therefore unable to say whether the Soviet Union does or does not help us enough. If the United States were to provide us with weapons, I could make comparisons.

/Question/ Do you mean that you would like some military aid from the West to supplement the aid coming from the East?

/Answer/ Mozambique is a nonaligned country. We established diplomatic relations with all countries on all continents, whatever their social, economic and political systems.

/Question/ What results do you expect from your visit to Europe?

/Answer/ Mine is not a specifically military mission. It is a political and diplomatic visit with the basic objective of establishing economic cooperation. We would like to have mutually profitable relations with Europe. At present the West European countries and Mozambique are not dealing with one another on an equal footing. Mozambique is still emerging from the effects of colonization.

"You Are Responsible"

/Question/ And your Marxist convictions?

/Answer/ When the United States trades with the USSR, does that mean that the United States is abandoning its political philosophy?

/Question/ Your regime's ideology then has not changed?

/Answer/ No.

/Question/ Your recently adopted economic program includes a plan for moving population from the cities to the rural areas...

/Answer/ We wish to give our unemployed an opportunity to find work. At the present time a large proportion of the urban population is unemployed. In the short term, farming is the sector where people can be productive. We need a large population, but it must consist of workers.

/Question/ Why does Mozambique, a country with fertile soil and wealthy in raw materials, experience so much difficulty in feeding itself?

/Answer/ That is the fault of Europe and the United States. In the final analysis you are responsible for our hunger, because you were the colonialists and because you encouraged illiteracy and ignorance among our people. As a result we lack technology, mechanics, agronomists, veterinarians and physicians. We have no scientific knowledge. All this we lack due to colonialism.

/Question/ What can the West do to remedy this situation?

/Answer/ The West knows very well what it must do. The West and the United States know the potential of my country better than I do. I would like them to help me and tell me what I do have. Moreover, the United States is well aware of Mozambique's strategic importance.

/Question/ Are you expecting American aid?

/Answer/ Since 1976 we have been inviting the United States to develop our farm production. You will have to ask the State Department why nothing has been happening.

/Question/ Amnesty International asserts that your government executes suspects without a trial.

/Answer/ Amnesty International dislikes us because we have the courage to publish our laws. It is true that we have the death penalty in our country. We introduced it following public demand at a time when the Rhodesians sent mercenaries in to kill our people, kidnap children, rape and kill women. Other countries carry out illegal executions. We kill according to the law.

/Question/ You mean to say that the Amnesty International report is wrong?

/Answer/ That is not for me to say. They have their opinion. We are inviting Western reporters to come and see for themselves.

11698

CSO: 3419/239

CENTRAL REGION OFFICIALS MEET IN MANICA DISTRICT

MB051510 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1030 GMT 5 Jan 84

[Text] The fourth central region interprovincial meeting began in Manica District today. It was attended by Marcelino dos Santos and Mario Machungo, the leaders of the provinces of Sofala and Zambezia respectively; Manueq Antonio, the governor of Manica; and Joao Francisco Pateguana, the acting governor of Tete Province.

Speaking at the opening session, the leader of Sofala Province said that the meeting would conduct an in depth examination of the political and military situation and the transportation and communications sectors in the four provinces. Marcelino dos Santos added that the discussion of these topics is aimed at finding correct ways of intensifying the struggle against famine and the armed bandits.

From Chimoio we received information this morning that the participants in the meeting, which is due to end tomorrow, will also visit economic and social sectors of Manica District.

CSO: 3442/111

FRIENDSHIP GROUP SCORES U.S. NUCLEAR MISSILES

MB051445 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 0430 GMT 5 Jan 84

[Text] Abner Sansao Muthemba, the secretary general of the Mozambique Association of Friendship and Solidarity with Peoples [AMASP], has pointed out that it was a mistake to think that the deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe is a problem which does not concern Africans.

Speaking in Maputo yesterday in a meeting of friendship for peace, Abner Sansao Muthemba said that as soon as imperialism destroys the socialist countries it will point its nuclear weapons against the African people, who will be defenseless against that kind of weapon. The U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles pointed against the USSR, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries are also pointed directly at us. Let us be well aware of that, the AMASP secretary general pointed out.

(Harald Heinke) urged the intensification of efforts against the nuclear plans of the United States and its NATO associates. The meeting of friendship for peace was jointly organized by AMASP and the GDR League for Friendship Among Peoples.

CSO: 3442/111

COMMENTARY SCORES NATIONAL RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES

MB051855 Maputo in English to Southern Africa 1100 GMT 05 Jan 84

[Station commentary]

[Text] Over the last year, the Mozambican press has published many detailed reports on the activities of a band of mercenary thugs who masquerade under the name, the Mozambique National Resistance. The thugs are not known by that name to the people of Mozambique. The people call them by a variety of names, all of which reflect hatred and contempt. One of the names is the Quizumba, which means hyena. Another is the armed bandits, which is self-explanatory. The targets of these bandits are usually defenseless civilians or railway lines or development projects which would help to improve the standard of living of the Mozambican people. The bandits lie in wait for buses and trains and machinegun the passengers. The bandits attack villages murdering peasants, destroying their homes and stealing their property.

These thugs call themselves the Resistance, but they are resisting what? When they line up captured civilians and machinegun them to death, or cut them into pieces with axes, what are they resisting? The answer is clear: They are neither resistance nor are they nationalists. They are hired killers. They are hired by the South African authorities to spread terror among the Mozambican people, to disrupt all this country's efforts to rise above the misery that was bequeathed to us by Portuguese colonialism. It is not by chance that these bandits in the pay of South Africa began their activities immediately after the Mozambican people won their independence from Portugal, and it is not only by chance that they stepped up their activities after the people of Zimbabwe won their independence with the help of Mozambique.

The bandits have no policy. Who has the policy is South Africa. The bandits are South Africa's puppets. South Africa chooses the targets--Mozambican men, women and children--and the bandits obey.

The puppets have caused much suffering and damage but they will not always have a puppet master. One day the puppets will be alone, and then where will they run to? The sensible ones will quickly take up President Samora Machel's generous offer of clemency and reintegration into society for those who give themselves up with their weapons.

CSO: 3400/480

BRIEFS

LOCAL MILITIAS STRENGTHENED--The 4th interprovincial meeting of the central zone of our country has decided to intensify the four provinces' efforts in the fight against famine and armed and unarmed gangs. The final communique from the meeting of Manica, Tete, Sofala and Zambezia Provinces reveals the decision to step up the formation of local militias for self-defense in all places of work and residence to guarantee the safety of the production sectors and communication routes. The Sofala and Zambezia leaders, Marcelino dos Santos and Mario Machungo respectively, and the acting Tete governor, Francisco Joao Pateguana, have already returned to their provinces. Before leaving the city of Chimoi, they visited the Textafrica factory yesterday morning with the Manica governor, Colonel Manuel Antonio. In the meeting with the Textafrica workers, Sofala leader Marcelino dos Santos stressed once again the need for the Mozambican people to participate in the self-defense forces to defeat famine and armed bandits. The Textafrica workers pledged, in a message read on the occasion, to actively participate in the struggle against famine and armed and unarmed gangs. The message shows that as part of the struggle against famine, this enterprise already has a 500-hectar maize farm and plans to build a high school and a literary center. [Text] [MB090952 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1030 GMT 8 Jan 84]

ENVOY VISITS MACAU--Lopes Tembe, the ambassador of the People's Republic of Mozambique accredited to the People's Republic of China, recently visited Macau in the context of the strengthening of trade relations between Mozambique and that territory, which is under Portuguese administration. During his visit to Macau, Ambassador Lopes Tembe paid a courtesy call on (Almeida Costa), the local governor. Trade relations between Mozambique and Macau have been strengthened since the last Maputo International Trade Fair, FACIM-83. The increase in trade with Macau may solve part of our country's difficulties regarding basic clothing needs, following the outcome of FACIM-83. [Text] [MB061846 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1030 GMT 6 Jan 84]

VIETNAMESE ENVOY CITES SUPPORT--The Vietnamese ambassador to Mozambique, Mr (?Nguyen Ngoc Vu), said in Maputo yesterday that the people of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea support the Mozambican people and the other people of the region in their struggle to defend and consolidate their national independence and to ensure peace, stability and prosperity. The Vietnamese diplomat was speaking to Mozambique's news media on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of Kampuchea's independence and the day of solidarity between the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and

Kampuchea support the policy of the People's Republic of Mozambique toward the racist Pretoria regime which was reiterated in President Samora Machel's New Year message. He added that exemplary relations exist in all fields, particularly in the fields of defense, security and economic development, between Mozambique and the three Asian socialist countries. [Text] [MB061954 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 0430 GMT 6 Jan 84]

SA REFUGEES WOUNDED IN BLAST--The Mozambique news agency AIM reports that a bomb attack at dawn on Wednesday, 7 December, seriously wounded two South African refugees. The two men suffered severe burns, but their lives are not in danger, AIM added. The explosion occurred in a building in the residential district of Xipamanine, blowing out windows and causing damage to neighboring residences. An inquiry has begun. /Text/ /Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Dec 83 p 6/ 11698

BRITISH DROUGHT AID--The British Government has given our country additional aid worth 250,000 pounds, about 15 million meticals, for drought victims. The donation consists of seeds, protein-enriched foodstuffs, and means of transportation. Previously, Great Britain offered to give Mozambique over 11,000 metric tons of foodstuffs for drought victims. [Text] [MB051012 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 0430 GMT 5 Jan 84]

CSO: 3442/111

MULTI-PARTY GROUP: INDEPENDENCE NOWHERE IN SIGHT

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 15 Nov 83 p 11

[Text]

WINDHOEK. — An assembly of political leaders discussing the future of South West Africa moved into closed session yesterday to deliberate on the stage reached by international efforts to take the territory to independence.

The privately initiated multi-party conference opened in Windhoek on Saturday with a public session in which the party leaders stated their intention to resolve SWA's constitutional, political and socio-economic problems.

Emphasis was given to the harmful effects of political uncertainty and frustration caused by protracted negotiations internationally to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, which specifies practical steps required to grant SWA internationally recognised independence.

"Independence is nowhere in sight," said the leader of the SWA National Union, Mr Moses Katjuongua.

Almost all the outstanding issues of dispute in UN Resolution 435 were reportedly cleared up after a visit to Southern Africa in August by the UN Secretary-General, Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar.

But Black Southern African Frontline state leaders have condemned the United States and South Africa for insisting on the withdrawal of Cuban soldiers from Angola as a prerequisite for the territory's independence.

Frontline presidents said in a weekend statement the linkage of the two issues was delaying the SWA independence settlement.

Sources at the Windhoek multi-party conference said the first item on yesterday's

agenda concerned negotiations conducted by the five-nation Western contact group — the US, Britain, France, Canada and West Germany — to implement Resolution 435.

Political groupings in the territory which sent delegates to the opening session of the multi-party conference on Saturday were Sanu, the Damara Raad, the Namibian Christian Democratic Party, the Rehoboth Liberation Front, Swapo Democrats, the SWA National Party and the 11 member parties of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance.

The SWA NP leader, Mr Kosie Pretorius, said in a statement yesterday his party — which controls the Legislative Assembly for Whites — would take a final decision on participation in the multi-party conference at a SWA NP executive meeting to be held today. — Sapa.

CSO: 3400/430

SECURITY POLICE FEAR INFILTRATION BY SWAPO

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 1 Nov 83 p 2

[Text]

WINDHOEK — The possibility that sections of the security forces in Namibia have been infiltrated by Swapo is being investigated, says the head of the Security Police in the territory, Colonel Sarel Strydom.

Colonel Strydom said yesterday that three Namibian security force members were among the nearly 50 people — senior civil servants, teachers, a priest and tribal villagers in the Kavango region — who had been arrested in security swoops in the past six weeks.

He said more people would probably be arrested as the police investigation progressed, but he did not want to give any information which might warn them in advance.

Colonel Strydom said that no

one had yet been charged.

Swapo, he said, had been trying to establish a series of guerrilla cells in the Western Kavango region for some time.

The organisation had also been trying to politicise the population through key personnel in a wide spectrum of the Kavango society, he said.

This is the first time in the 16-year-old bush war that so many government figures and influential personalities have been detained in such an intensive operation.

It is also the first time it has been officially confirmed that Swapo might have infiltrated the security forces.

In 1981, nearly 30 servicemen openly rebelled against their military training at a base at Okahandja.

CSO: 3400/430

COLUMNIST URGES CALLING SOUTH AFRICA'S BLUFF

Windhoek WINDHOEK OBSERVER in English 10 Dec 83 p 31

[Commentary by Gwen Lister: "Why Trust South Africa Now?"]

[Text]

1983 is drawing to a close and the Namibia question is no nearer to a settlement than it ever was. In fact, it is the opinion of most observers that an internationally-supervised election is an unlikely prospect in the near future.

The why's and wherefore's are many, and have been dealt with at length on many occasions, and the question facing the country at present is how to find a way out of this predicament and succeed in achieving the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435.

Yet another question which must be raised, presuming that the country is united in a call for the implementation of the said Resolution, is whether the South African Government would in fact take cognisance of the wishes of the people of the territory.

Up until now, many parties in the country (and they represent the majority) have called for the implementation of Resolution 435. Others have made their agreement conditional, and a few have rejected it outright.

But the situation has changed. Parties which previously called for the implementation of this Resolution, have now allied themselves with other political

parties not in favour of implementation. So what is their position now?

**NO ATTEMPTS TO
REVIVE IT**

Parties such as Swanu, Swapo D and the Damara Council, previously vehement in their calls for an election in terms of Resolution 435, have now made themselves signatory to a statement which says little more than condemning Resolution 435 as being dormant or even dead, but have done little themselves in an attempt to revive the said Resolution.

In the context of the multi-party conference, they have not even attempted to convince other groups, such as the DTA, the Liberation Front and the National Party, that Resolution 435 (although perhaps not perfect) is still the best solution for the Namibia problem.

It does not help to take the attitude of "well, we are in favour of Resolution 435, but it seems to be on the rocks, so let us think of alternatives", and one gains the impression that their attitude is one of passive acceptance, that 435 is dead, and that not even their efforts will revive it.

The National Party of course, remains unalterably

opposed to any UN-supervised elections; the DTA claims it has accepted Resolution 435, but here it agrees with the South African Government, namely, that the Cubans should be withdrawn from Angola before such a settlement is embarked upon, and the Liberation Front, well, all Mr Hans Diergarrdt wants is his homeland.

PUT IT TO THE TEST

South Africa is constantly on record as stating that the 'people will decide'. And I feel that it is time that this rather wild promise of hers be put to the test. A united call for the implementation of Resolution 435 from each and every corner of this country, would place that Government in an awkward predicament.

Would she, or would she not, abide by the will of the people in such a case?

It is easy to say the 'people will decide' when she herself sponsors and supervises an election, for she realises full well that Swapo would not participate, and therefore that danger is removed. It is equally easy for her to say the 'people will decide' when referring to the multi-party conference, and the strong possibility that a call for an interim government will emerge from that body, for of course, Swapo participation would not be a consideration, and in addition, she is presented with the alternative she always wanted.

But the 'will of the people' was not represented in the December 18 1978 election, and neither are the people of Namibia overwhelmingly pro-DTA as would appear from those election results. (We had a similar case in Zimbabwe when Bishop Muzorewa thought he had the population behind him, but it proved to be the biggest mistake of his life).

THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE

And neither is the 'will of the people' represented in the multi-party conference. Although perhaps initially a commendable idea, most of the parties present there do not have the support of their own people and indeed, many parties are completely divided on the issue.

And people are not certain what, if anything, will emerge from the multi-party conference. Many feel that if its purpose is to achieve the implementation of Resolution 435, well and good. But the conference has already passed the point where it could have made such a call.

Their commitment to Resolution 435 is by no means absolute.

But if I could appeal to at least certain elements of the multi-party conference, I would request that they put on record their opinions regarding Resolution 435, and that they make a strong call for its implementation before it is too late. They should not allow themselves to be led into an excuse for a settlement, which would be in the form of an interim government, for they too, are aware of what has happened in the past, and that history has a tendency to repeat itself.

How many times did the DTA not proudly announce 'The DTA governs', how many promises were not kept, and how much credibility did they not lose, as a result of a token and hollow pretence at 'government', while all the time it was the South African Government which held the strings?

WHY TRUST THEM NOW?

The parties present at the multi-party conference must be aware of this fact, and as they never trusted the South African

Government in the past, so why should they start now? They may well achieve, in the form of an interim government, somewhat more than that which the DTA received as far as concessions are concerned, but the important issues, the life-and-death issues, will remain in the hands of the Government across the Orange River.

A strong call, for the implementation of Resolution 435, and those parties who do not agree, will fall away, and so what if they do? For it is apparent they do not have at heart, the interests of the majority of Namibians would not agree that the country is in a total mess at present? Very few of them at any rate. And that 'mess' has been brought about, not by Swapo (whom some people fear will bring this country to

its knees) or any other political party, but by the South African Government itself.

A Government which has had years of 'practice', which is accustomed to ruling and who cannot claim inexperience like so many of the 'ethnic' governments which have been under the scrutiny of the Thirion Commission.

'Look at what happened to Angola after the MPLA victory' is the usual rather tiring example given by critics.

Why don't they say instead: 'Look at what happened to Namibia before Swapo took over'!

In conclusion, South Africa would not heed a call, however united, for the implementation of Resolution 435, but let those parties who are truly concerned about the future of Namibia and its people go on record demanding the implementation of Resolution 435, which may be our only hope.

CSO: 3400/427

ARMY, CONSTABLES ACCIDENTALLY FIGHT, KILL TWO

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 7 Dec 83 p 1

[Text]

A BLOODY FIRE-FIGHT between Army troops and Special Constables lead to the death of two members of the Security Forces according to the latest inquest files handed in to the Attorney General's office.

The latest inquest files are raw testament to the senseless loss of lives in the war-torn north.

They show how Army troops and Special Constables accidentally ambushed each other in Owambo leaving two men dead and two wounded.

One man from each group was killed in the fire-fight in which the two patrols fought each other with the frenzy they thought was reserved for their foes.

The Special Constable patrol were in search of marauding guerillas 15km north east of Ondangwa on February 18.

They were bodyguards of the former Member of the Ministers' Council, Mr Tara Imbili.

In the darkness of night

they stumbled into a temporary military base.

As the bodyguards approached the base a rifleman standing guard reported that a group of "armed Black men in camouflage uniforms" were approaching.

"We thought they were terrorists because our information was that there were no other soldiers on patrol in the area," Rifleman Robert Sivewright, 19, said to the Attorney-General in a statement.

"We opened fire on a range of 25 metres. The fire was returned immediately".

A volley of machinegun fire shattered the silence of the night.

For six minutes hot lead rained from rifle barrels.

In the cross-fire national serviceman Mark Basson, 20, was shot in the back.

The bullet cut through his heart, aorta and lungs and he was in an acute condition.

A helicopter was radioed to perform a casualty evacuation.

But rifleman Basson died 20 minutes before it arrived.

A Special Constable was the second fatality in the unscheduled battle.

When firing ceased it was found the Special Constables had been mistaken for Swapo insurgents.

Three Special Constables had been wounded.

One of the wounded men was lifted by the helicopter in the emergency flight.

But he died later in the helicopter, according to Rifleman Sivewright.

He was not named.

At the inquest hearing into the death of Rifleman Basson in Ondangwa on October 31, Magistrate AH Coetzer returned a verdict of undecided liability.

CSO: 3400/427

POPULATION STATISTICS FOR WINDHOEK PROVIDED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 14 Dec 83 p 5

[Text]

WINDHOEK — Windhoek's population has passed the 100 000 mark, joining the ranks of the world's intermediary cities, according to the latest figures compiled by the Windhoek City Council.

The estimate is 104 100. There are 30 100 whites, 23 500 coloureds and 50 500 blacks. The Windhoek population itself is estimated at 36 000, Khomasdal, 19 700 and Katutura at 48 100.

In the 1981 official census, whites were estimated at 29 432, coloureds 20 374 and blacks at 46 261, a total of 96 057, compared with 74 349 in 1975.

The report noted that both the number of deaths for whites (7,14 per 1 000) and coloureds (12,4 per 1 000), were lower than the corresponding figures of 9,1 and 14,8 in South Africa in 1970.

The death rate in Katutura remained high at 17,1 per 1 000

and was still far from the corresponding figure of 14 per 1 000 of South Africa.

This figure was lower than the 1975 figure of 18,74 deaths, indicating a definite improvement in health conditions, the statement added.

In 1961, there were 4 597 white pupils at schools in Windhoek, 447 coloureds and 1 869 blacks.

In 1975, the numbers were 9 334 whites, 3 052 coloureds and 5 369 blacks. The number of white children had declined to 8 555 in 1981, coloureds rose to 4 772 and blacks rose to 10 230.

Both birth and death rates among all population groups were declining. The result of the negative growth rates among whites and the high positive growth rates among coloureds and blacks was ascribed to migration. — Sapa.

CSO: 3400/427

NUJOMA: SA RECRUITING MERCENARIES FOR 'MURDER SQUAD'

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 12 Dec 83 p 4

[Text]

HARARE: Swapo leader Mr Sam Nujoma said in Harare last week South Africa was recruiting mercenaries from the west to fight alongside its forces in the disputed territory.

He told reporters in Harare after a brief visit that South Africa had set up a "murder squad" mostly mercenaries, to kill SWA/Namibian intellectuals who were preaching politics to the local population.

Mr Nujoma said South Africa was desperate to maintain its tight military and economic grip on SWA/Namibia and was recruiting mercenaries.

— He would not say how many — from Britain, Spain, Israel, Canada, West Germany, the United States and Latin American countries.

He said they also included some Portuguese who had fought in Mozambique against President Samora Machel's Frelimo Party and whites from Zimbabwe.

Some of the mercenaries had been formed into a special battalion to "systematically exterminate" SWA/Namibian intellectuals such as doctors, teachers and nurses for their alleged role in the Nationalist movement, he said.

"But this will not help because the war is already being felt throughout Namibia, including the capital of Windhoek.

"Even the racist minority white settlers in Namibia are now divided... because the economy is declining as a result of the intensification of the armed struggle. They also fear for their lives," Mr Nujoma added.

He claimed the military

and political situation in SWA/Namibia was critical.

"They (the South Africans) refuse to learn from other people's struggles, like here in Zimbabwe."

Mr Nujoma said he had visited Zimbabwe for consultations with Mr Robert Mugabe's government. He left today for Zambia to meet president Kenneth Kaunda.

In Pretoria, an SA Defence Force spokesman described the claims as Mr Nujoma's "latest flight of fantasy."

"As in the past, Mr Nujoma's statement reveal only that he has absolutely no idea of what is happening in South West Africa and even less of what is happening in the SADF.

"His latest flight of fantasy is of no interest to anyone," the spokesman said. — Sapa

CSO: 3400/427

TSUMEB CORPORATION TO CLOSE COPPER MINE

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 8 Dec 83 p 1

[Text]

TSUMEB CORPORATION Limited today unexpectedly announced it was shutting its Matchless mine near Windhoek "due to the depressed state of the markets for copper and lead."

The mine is about 30 km west of Windhoek.

Rationalisation of TCL will lead to the retrenchment of 920 employees.

It forms part of a general rationalisation of TCL's activities in Namibia, a statement by the mining company's head office in Tsumeb said.

The Tsumeb statement said Matchless was the smallest and most expensive of TCL's four production units.

"The rationalisation will enable the Corporation to maintain a marginally decreased rate of production without having to undertake further economies," it added.

Those retrenched from TCL's 6 500-strong workforce would be

granted special benefits including a "liberal period of notice and a relocation allowance which facilitates their return to their place of origin."

"They are also being granted ample time to stay in Company accommodation while seeking alternative employment."

The Corporation had maintained "full employment" over the past three years despite "significant losses."

These losses had been financed by a R20m shareholder contribution and a similar amount through overseas bank loans.

But "due to high interest rates and the discouraging outlook for metals' prices

and demand the Corporation recognises that it would be imprudent to borrow additional funds."

Continued depressed world demand for copper and lead, and low prices could threaten TCL's long-term financial condition unless protective measures were taken.

The possibility of government assistance had been explored.

However, "while sympathetic and concerned, the government and the Corporation agree that intervention at this stage is difficult to justify."

The statement listed the declining world prices for copper and lead since 1978.

Copper had dropped from R2 210 to R1 790 a ton in January this year, and lead from R1 070 to R470 — at constant 1983 prices!

CSO: 3400/427

INVESTIGATION OF MINING INDUSTRY CALLED FOR

Windhoek WINDHOEK OBSERVER in English 10 Dec 83 p 10

[Editorial: "Investigate Lest the Stain Grows"]

[Text]

Nothing but a thorough scrutiny could ever remove the justified or unjustified label that has been attached to South West Africa's mining industry - a tag which imputes the industry of simply being a collection of foreign groups, in some cases the lesser subsidiary of gigantic multinationals.

The stain is on the garment, and it is growing in both pronouncement and size. It is an ugly estimate that has started to take root in the mind of the average citizen. He believes, and nothing has happened to dispel these beliefs, that while he struggles in his country to make ends meet, the only sizable purse his country has, being its minerals and diamonds, are being pillaged by interests who are not even members of his country's citizens, and who give nothing in return for what is being taken out.

It is pointless to shrug this estimate off with the remark that the ignorant and the malicious are guilty of such views. If there is nothing to hide, why the hesitancy to have the industry examined from tail to head?

Too much is under the blanket; too much is shielded by the decrees governing the lair of the Holy Cow, called in this case 'strategic factors.' Like the word 'security' which has become the torment and the persecutor of even the law-abiding citizen, this thing about 'strategic interest' is another monstrosity, freely used by people who in certain cases do not even know the grammatical definition of the term.

We want clean administration in South West Africa, for already we are more than halfway on the road to the worst form of communism the world had ever known. We also want to know what is happening to the limited natural resources we have.

We find it stupendous that Tsumeb Corporation does not pay any tax for the year, but its financial reports released overseas and not here, lists the dividends paid in that same year to shareholders as 42 million American dollars.

No one will ever know what has been produced in the form of diamonds since 1920, where was it sold, what

was paid for it and what did South West Africa get out of it - the owner, and the custodian of that wealth.

The moment inquiries are made, the questioner is inundated with abuse and high-falutin English expressions which looks very learned on paper, but which in terms of helping this stricken land is but a further example of the abuse with which we are treated by our various government systems, and of course those owning our natural resources who are in all cases foreigners.

The fish industry died, as a result of pillaging. The helpless cry is that the 'Communist block' robbed' us while it is mainly South African scavengers who did the plundering.

We are not far from a similar fate in regard to mining.

CSO: 3400/427

BRIEFS

'ORGY' OF MURDERS--ONDANGUA--The latest batch of judicial inquests into unnatural deaths in South West Africa's war zone shows that wilful slaughter is still the order of the day. Civilians are the victims of this orgy of murder, at times accompanied by plunder and robbery. Several inquests were held by Mr. A. H. Coetzer, an additional magistrate of the Tsumeb circuit of the lower court. In a sworn affidavit Miss Maria Martin, 22, said that she was the girl friend of Mr David Jason, 28. She said that two SWAPO insurgents, dressed in battle fatigues, had fetched her boyfriend who was subsequently machinegunned. In yet another inquest Mr Coetzer was told that Mr Phillipus Shafa, 30, was fetched from a cuca shop in the Okamonde area of the Ovambo-speaking region, and eye-witnesses saw how the captured man's hands were tied behind his back. He was then taken away to a spot not far from where he was captured, and shot. In both cases Mr Coetzer found criminal liability, and said in his ruling that the murders were committed by unidentified SWAPO insurgents. [Text] [Windhoek WINDHOEK OBSERVER in English 10 Dec 83 p 30]

'BITTER' REACTION TO DETENTION--WINDHOEK--The secretary of the NGK Missionary Society in Windhoek, the Reverend Peet Strauss, yesterday expressed "bitter regret" at the detention of a leading South West African member of the Evangelical Reformed Church in Africa (NGK), the Reverend Nikodemus Nairenge. Mr Nairenge (42), was taken into custody by security police in terms of Security Proclamation AG 9 at Nkurenkuru, in Western Kavango, last week. An official spokesman said yesterday he was still being held. "I feel bitterly sorry for him and his family, as well as for his work, Mr Strauss said. "One can only trust that if there are reasons for his detention, that he will be brought to trial--if not, that he will be set free. Colleagues of Mr Nairenge described him as a highly respected churchman who was opposed to violence in all forms. Mr Nairenge is stationed at Takwasa in eastern Kavango, but he was detained on a visit to his mother and his sistern in western Kavango, near the Angolan border. Proclamation AG 9 provides for detention for periods of 30 days, but the detention orders may be renewed by the Administrator-General. Earlier reports said more than 20 people were being held in terms of Proclamation AG 9 in Kavango. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 16 Nov 83 p 4]

INQUIRY INTO SECURITY SOON--WINDHOEK--A Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Security Legislation in SWA/Namibia was expected to begin work in due course, an official spokesman said here yesterday. The Commission, to be chaired by Mr Justice H P van Dyk, was appointed last week by proclamation in the

official gazette of the Administrator-General of SWA/Namibia. The other members of the commission are Messrs H J Taljaardt, J D de Bruyn, G S Coetzee and G J Muller. The appointment was "in view of the revolutionary onslaught" on SWA/Namibia and "the terrorist war waged in certain parts." The Commission's task is to examine security legislation in the territory and to submit recommendations concerning its "adequacy, fairness and efficacy." According to the proclamation, evidence would be heard behind closed doors, unless the chairman decided otherwise, while officials and employees of the Commission would have to take an oath of secrecy. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 17 Nov 83 p 4]

CSO: 3400/430

TAHOUA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PROJECT EXPLAINED

Niamey SAHEL HEBDO in French 5 Dec 83 pp 11-13

/Text/ The Tahoua production program originates in the cooperation between the Niger and the FRG by way of the GTZ /German Agency for Technical Cooperation/. Since 1980, when it started, the project has stirred intensive action: For the growth of farm output by simple and profitable techniques within reach of the farmers and with a view to self-sufficiency in food supplies; for the emplacement of a participative structure; for an increase in rural incomes and, finally, the restoration of the ecological balance.

Actually these are the principal objectives defined and undertaken by the project that, in order to well conduct its operations on the spot and taking into account the needs of the farmers, is composed of four principal sections--the nerve center of the project is headed by Tassiou Aminou, an agricultural engineer. The following are the principal sections: The popularization section, managed by Heyd Jean-Charles; the training section, directed by Soumana Goudia; the applied research section, headed by Batoure Ibrahim and, lastly, the land asset section, managed by Dr Helmut Woehl, GTZ representative with the project.

Let me emphasize that the project at Tahoua departmental level has defined its proper zones of action; they amount to four and are the districts of Tahoua, Keita, Bouza and Madaoua.

These regions were chosen from the aspect of the density of population in each zone, the acuteness of agricultural problems, the physical representativeness, the agricultural calling, subregional equilibrium and the prediction of zones of expansion.

Let us now look at the roles and operations of each section since the project started.

The popularization section's scope of operations relies on the cooperatives to record the needs of the cooperators from the aspect of agricultural input, seeing that it is the objective of popularization to have more and more farmers--organized in groups--participate in the popularization of the topics proposed, with the aim to associate as many farmers as possible with popularization, to speed up the spread of innovations and, finally, to get the farmers to discuss their proper problems.

We are collaborating with the regional delegates of UNCC /expansion unknown/, the control assistants and the farmers themselves by means of the cooperatives. The UNCC delegate is assisted by the person in charge of technical operations, who supervises the work at project level. In the course of the project itself, the farmers organize demonstration fields on which modern and traditional farming techniques are practiced. To that end the technical popularization services provide the farmers with the necessary supplies: Sorghum, millet and beans as the main crops as well as mineral fertilizers and pesticides as part of the struggle against pests."

When the agricultural project first began, said Heyd Jean-Charles, seeds and fertilizers were supplied the farmers on credit.

It turned out, though, that problems arose with regard to the recovery of the money, and it was therefore later decided to sell for cash only.

As concerns market gardening, the popularization campaign proceeds with the same control structure, and the project supplies vegetable seed and fertilizer.

In 3 years of operation, the popularization campaign has recorded satisfactory results. Still, a psychological problem arose insofar as it seems that the attitude of the assistant controllers tends to offend the farmers who, in turn, are said to lack motivation. To produce a more satisfactory situation, it would be well for the project to emphasize the employment of farmers trained at the CPT's /Advanced Technical Training Centers/ within the framework of popularization, to achieve better popularization and the assumption of greater responsibility by the farmers.

Soumana Goudia, for his part, emphasized with regard to training, that the project deals with the recruitment and training of assistant controllers. In January 1980 40 assistant controllers were recruited, trained and pursued a 2-months course of instruction in such topics as selection of seeds, the application of fungicides, density of sowing, light plowing, fertilizer supply, weeding, prompt weed pulling and getting down to cultivation.

Refresher Courses

At the end of the course, 35 assistant controllers were assigned to popularization, while others were sent to the Center for Training Young Farmers (GMV) at Maradi for another 9 months of instruction. Subsequently these assistant controllers have been operating in the regions to familiarize themselves with the project's farming methods. Every year (January and February) these agents attend a refresher course lasting 1-2 weeks.

It remains to remember that, parallel to these refresher courses, a course in cooperative education also proceeds--this one concerned with training the farmers. The training course is short. The course of cooperative education involves the administrative councils of the Village Mutual Groups (GMB's) and cooperatives. It aims at achieving the effective participation of the population in the development operations and at preparing it to take on the administration of its own affairs.

In addition to all these activities there is also the preparation of campaigns with the objective (according to Soumana Goudia) of evaluating the previous season's

farm work and planning future farm operations at district level, in collaboration with all the interested technical services.

There is also a training course for model poultry farmers. "We have 11 pilot hen houses," says Soumana Goudia, "the farmers take a 15-day course on the upkeep, organization and management of hen houses. At the end of the course, each cooperative has one hen house with a trained model farmer ensuring that it is properly run."

There is also a course for store managers. Eleven stores were set up in 1983. The project made available to them a development fund in the amount of 800,000 francs, and the farmers there obtain essential products, the list of which they draw up themselves. At the present time stores are actually operating in Keita, Bouza, Madaoua and Tahoua.

This training generally touches on all areas of the production project by way of the CPT's.

The applied research section at the Tahoua agricultural production project tests all the farm varieties in the various districts where the project is operating, with a view to raising the yields of the main crops--millet, sorghum and beans. As Batoure Ibrahim informed us, satisfactory results have been achieved after 3 years of trials and research.

Among all the vegetable matter tested in the regions where the project is operational, conclusive results have been obtained for millet, but further efforts are needed with regard to beans and sorghum. The vegetable matter tested at the project includes the varieties CIVT, HKP, 3/4 HR, P3 Kolo Ancoutess, GR P1 and DG P1 for millet, TN 88-63 for beans and L30 A4 A4, Baba dia Fara for sorghum as well as local varieties.

To do these tests, trials proceeded with cultivation techniques and two systems for working the land. With regard to millet, the methods tested were scarification and cultivation without scarification, and the differences in the resulting yields were recorded.

The scarification system for millet and plowing for sorghum did in fact result in a difference, from the first sprouting on, as well as in a better development of the plants--reflected in the yield--increasing due to greater humidity. According to Batoure Ibrahim, all parameters on the scraped soil are satisfactory as regards the yield of this variety." [as published]

Of course the yield depends on the kind of soil, the application and follow-up of the systems of cultivation and also on rainfall. We should remember that the project has 36 rainfall recording stations in all its operational regions to measure rainfall; two of these stations are semi-automatic and simultaneously measure rainfall, relative humidity, wind speeds and direction, and temperatures. These devices are battery operated and installed at Tahoua and Keita.

Lastly the land asset section, headed by Dr Helmut Woehl, GTZ representative at the project, is concerned with reafforestation, the protection of crops and also with the principal tree species of Niger and their usefulness both for the livestock and the reafforestation of the region.

The land asset section therefore set up two tree nurseries (windbreaks) and plants trees free of charge within the framework of the project--the nurseries have so far planted 30,000-50,000 seedlings.

"This is a crucial operation," emphasizes Dr Woehl, "insofar as erosion and the spoilation of the environment are, in the long run, limiting the impact of the measures aiming at an increase in productivity. Moreover, if we wish to record satisfactory results, we need the involvement of the people for reafforestation and land improvement."

Popular involvement is needed for the upkeep of the tree nurseries and the other public works. The 1982 reafforestation program, for example, envisaged the production of 220,000 seedlings to cover around 850 hectares with living hedges and windbreaks, to protect river banks and stabilize dunes.

Unfortunately it happens that problems arise, especially with regard to the protection of the plants. That is why the people in charge of the project fervently wish for the public to realize and be motivated by the importance of the project.

Summing up all the operations, the results achieved and still to come, of the Tahoua production program, director Tassiou Aminou first recounted the history of the project, the various stages since financing was negotiated by the two countries, up to the current phase. Tassiou Aminou also spoke of the basic objectives of this project, the first being self-sufficiency in food supplies in the Tahoua Department that suffered badly in the severe drought ravaging Niger.

In the course of our conversation, Tassiou Aminou emphasized the training of farmers and assistant controllers. Training by way of the CPT's, the mastery of farming techniques by the farmers resulting from demonstration fields and parcels of land. In the course of our talks with the project director, we discussed the results achieved since its beginning--but also the costs, in other words the money spent on carrying out the project.

Tassiou Aminou underlined the fact that 3455 million francs CFA were spent on the project in 1981-1982. In 1983 the total will amount to 186 million francs CFA, while the grand total for 1982-1985 is expected to run to 1,800,000,000 francs CFA.

As happens with all large-scale projects similar to Tahoua, problems specific to rural life and cultivation techniques have arisen with regard to popularization, planning, training and coordination among the technical services operating on the spot. According to Tassiou Aminou these problems are being progressively resolved. He ended our conversation by expressing his wish to see construction begin of the Tahoua headquarters of the production project; at the moment the design plans are still languishing in some drawers.

At the present time the people in the project's operating regions are welcoming the economic efforts of the project that--let us recall this again--has seen the light of day thanks to cooperation between the FRG and our country. It is a project that, with great optimism, pursues the objectives chosen.

BRIEFS

KOUNTCHE NEW YEAR MESSAGE--Niamey, 1 Jan (AFP)--Niger head of state General Seyni Kountche on Saturday expressed the hope that by "a great manifestation of solidarity" the international community would come to the aid of the millions of Niger citizens who have been hit by a food shortage because of drought. During the ceremony of the presentation of new year wishes by the diplomatic corps, Gen Kountche added that the economic crisis had rendered "Niger's economic recovery efforts particularly precarious," and said he hoped he would be able to count on the "kind support" of foreign partners of his country. On the international scene, the head of state hoped that an "equitable solution would come out of 9 January roundtable conference of Addis Ababa" between the various parties to the Chadian conflict, and hoped that "conditions for a referendum in Western Sahara" would soon be met. Gen Kountche also expressed "sentiments of profound bitterness" over recent events in southern Africa and the Middle East, which, he said, had withered "his hope to see the Namibian and Palestinian peoples national rights completely restored." [Text] [AB041335 Paris AFP in French 0951 GMT 1 Jan 84]

CSO: 3419/304

SPECULATION SAID RIFE AS TO MOTIVES BEHIND GOWON VISIT

London AFRICA NOW in English No 32, Dec 83 pp 28-29

[Text]

In October, a group of Yakubu Gowon's friends, headed by businessman Chief Godfrey Amachree of Rivers State, were said to be sponsoring a visit to his homeland this month by Nigeria's former Head of State — more than two years after President Shehu Shagari had granted him a full pardon and formally cleared him of any charge of complicity in the attempted coup against his successor, the late General Murtala Mohammed.

What were the reasons for delaying his return and what are the likely consequences of his visit? Speculation is rife.

Gowon's homecoming will end eight years in exile, most of which was spent in England where his studies included acquiring a doctorate in political science.

His nine years' rule in Nigeria came to an end in 1975 while he was at the OAU summit in Kampala. A coup was staged by some of his closest colleagues, including former Foreign Minister Joe Garba and the man who was to replace him as Head of State: General Murtala Mohammed. Murtala was himself only to rule for six months before being killed in yet another attempted coup.

Gowon had brought Nigeria through some tense moments following the 1966 coup, including the civil war. Later, he made his mark as a statesman in a remarkable programme of reconciliation and reconstruction. The end came only when he was unable to control some of his indisciplined and corrupt military governors; at the same time, he failed to fulfil his promise to return to democratic rule. He was stripped of his rank by General Olusegun Obasanjo (Murtala Mohammed's successor) and exiled.

He was pardoned on October 1, 1981, Nigeria's National Day, by President Shehu Shagari, but his rank of general was not restored — which as far as he was concerned was less than satisfactory since it could be interpreted that he was not totally absolved from complicity in a crime of which he persistently claims his complete innocence.

It is believed that his delay in returning to his homeland was a tacit protest at this anomaly. Another factor was the linking of his own pardon with that of Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, even though the latter's was not granted until May 1982, seven months later. It could well be that Gowon felt resentful that his pardon should in any way be connected with that of the man who led the Biafran secession attempt which he had crushed after a long and bloody civil war.

The sponsors of this month's visit (ostensibly solely to see his family and friends) insisted that there were no political motives behind it — something very difficult for the average Nigerian to accept. Indeed, the general view is that the visit will provide Gowon with the opportunity to feel the mood of the country before making any decision as to his political future. According to one normally reliable source, his eventual return to Nigeria is planned for early 1985.

It is being suggested that he may well emerge as the major challenger to Dr Azikiwe's leadership of the Nigeria People's Party (NPP); that Zik may even accept him as his successor in a calculated move to punish Ojukwu for his challenge to the old warhorse's ethnic ascendancy in Igbo-land.

According to this scenario, Zik would gain broader support as a reconstituted national visionary and champion of ethnic rights within the Nigerian body politic. He would, therefore, be in a better position to end his political career on a high note of reconciliation and national responsibility.

Astutely, Gowon has, publicly at least, only sent congratulatory messages to some leaders and has hardly endorsed policies or criticised actions in the last few years, so he cannot be accused of partisanship.

It should be remembered, however, that Gowon headed the government in which both Chief Obafemi Awolowo and President Shagari served as Commissioners of Finance and that he received Zik on his return to the federal fold from his flirtation

with Ojukwu's secessionist movement.

Nor is it considered accidental that Gowon devoted his nearly a decade of exile to obtaining three degrees in political science.

He belongs to a Northern minority group from Plateau State. (This, more than any partisan sympathy, might explain his congratulatory message to Governor Lar in Jos.) In terms of the basic ideological constituency from which he could plan a return to the politics of modern, post-military Nigeria, his options are clearcut. The emergence of national leadership in 1987 from among the so-called minorities is an important factor which must be considered in the development of an ideological position. Or he may promote himself as a totally deregionalised figure.

Gowon has been considered the one minority candidate with a proven national vision. Many people believe that his era as Head of State has eventually emerged as being the best-managed period of post-independence planning and government; that, in spite of the civil war, it was under his leadership that the key development strategies, which have largely been vindicated by time, were initiated. These led to Black Africa's best road network and a continuing thrust towards industrialisation which, although it has hit enormous obstacles, continues to offer hope for a self-sufficient national economy.

Gowon's predilection for caution may cause him to conceal his real political intentions for a longer period than at first he intended.

Certain major anomalies may have to be resolved; his military rank may have to be restored to distinguish his real achievements in the past from those of Ojukwu. In terms of reconciliation of forces it is even more important for future stability, that Gowon be seen to be accepted by those serving and retired army officers who sat in judgement upon him and found him guilty during the bitter days of the post-Murtala military trials ●

CSO: 3400/325

EDITORIAL COMMENT ON FOREIGN, DOMESTIC TOPICS

New PFP Policy

Capetown DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 21 Nov 83 p 10

[Editorial "A Complete Turnabout"]

[Text] With the policy statement by Dr Van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the Progressive Federal Party [PFP] and with the unanimous decision of the PFP-convention on Saturday to participate "constructively" in the constitutional order, the official opposition has undertaken an entirely new course of action. Seldom if ever has a South African political party made such a turnabout.

Instead of the almost fatal boycott-policy which his party has followed since the establishment of the President's Council and for which he has been chastized mercilessly, Dr Slabbert now comes and asks his followers to participate "positively and constructively" in the new order--even in the President's Council.

That ultimate realistic policy--even if the result of necessity--is to be welcomed.

In the end, Dr Slabbert could do nothing else. He simply had to reconsider after such a large portion of his supporters--some estimate as high as 30%--voted yes in the referendum.

Apparently Dr Slabbert and the convention delegates had already realized that something drastic had to be done to stop the erosion in the PFP and that a standpoint had to be adopted to ensure that the wayward yes-voters would not be permanently alienated from the party.

In the weekend, Dr Slabbert gave strong leadership in this direction, but in doing so he admitted in so many words that he and his group of leaders had completely gotten off track. We believe he has now done something he was forced to do by the voters in spite of his own wishes and judgment. He would only have destroyed his party further if he had not accepted the decision of the majority by trying from now on to make the best of the new situation.

In addition to accepting the reality of the situation and adjusting his policies accordingly, Dr Slabbert admitted something significant. He stated that the large yes-vote was a mandate for reform rather than support for the particulars of the new constitution.

In doing so, Dr Slabbert put a feather in the cap of the National Party and its supporters in the campaign for a yes-vote, since this means that he recognizes that most white voters have greater confidence in the Government's plans for reform than in the propaganda of the PFP that this would be mere "reform for show".

Only time will tell how Dr Slabbert and the PFP will fare in their new roles. They will be watched with great anticipation.

New White Paper on Education

Capetown DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 24 Nov 83 p 26

[Editorial: "Education"]

[Text] In the Government's white paper on provision of education which was issued yesterday, no doubt is left about at least one thing. The Government is quite serious about working toward a system in which all disadvantages and inequalities in the education of all races will be eliminated.

That this will be no simple task will be admitted by all who reasonably consider the implications of this effort. First of all, the Government does not have unlimited funds at its disposal to create ideal conditions as it were overnight; and secondly there are not enough persons educated for the task.

It is laudable that the Government nevertheless has made improvement of education for all of us its goal. Unfortunately this is an effort which apparently is being misconstrued intentionally and with clear political motives by those who already began to rally against the white paper yesterday as one more confirmation of apartheid.

It would be a shame if we are unable to make education less of a political toy. In the long run this will only be to the detriment of South Africa and all its people. And that in a period in which one of the most important priorities is the educational uplifting of as many people as possible to help in developing the country.

South Africa now stands on the eve of implementing a new constitutional system, and various aspects of the white paper indicate that the Government has taken into consideration that any new educational system must be able to be integrated into the new constitutional order.

It is obvious that there are also persons with good intentions who will not agree with all of the particulars of the white paper. Among them are those

who argued in favor of a ministry of education, something that the Government found unacceptable, apparently in view of certain principles of the new order. Nevertheless, we believe that these people will appreciate other aspects of the Government's new plan. After all, that was already made quite clear by certain reactions yesterday.

It must always be borne in mind that the Government has set down a broad educational framework in this document which has yet to be adapted to the new constitutional arrangement and many details of which can only be worked out later.

Finally, appreciation must be expressed for the work which the De Lange Investigation Commission and the Provisional Educational Task Group have done in the search for a better educational system for South Africa. Yesterday's white paper clearly shows the merit of their work.

Border Area Conflict Potential

Johannesburg DIE VADERLAND in Afrikaans 11 Nov 83 p 16

[Editorial: "Vulnerability of Limpopo Region"]

[Text] The terrorist attack on the evening of the day before yesterday once again called attention to the vulnerability of the Limpopo Region.

Various incidents have already occurred in the region where the Limpopo connects South Africa to Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

The Kruger Wildlife Reserve on occasion has been the site of exchanges of fire and even of terrorist activities.

Recently two South Africans were killed by the Botswana police and a third barely escaped with his life.

And on Tuesday, army personnel from Zimbabwe and Botswana shot at each other.

This is an extremely sensitive area where destabilization can turn into reality and where irresponsible or intentionally aggressive actions or even a misunderstanding could lead to armed confrontations and even war between countries.

This is an area which is well suited for forays across borders. Thus, for example, Zimbabwe claims that it was not its soldiers who shot at Botswana's soldiers, but Mr Joshua Nkomo's Zapu rebels. And it accuses South Africa of being their host.

Botswana is vulnerable because it permits refugee camps on its territory from which people can undertake illegal operations in Zimbabwe or South Africa. This in turn can lead to counterraid and conflicts with Botswana's police or soldiers.

The same is true of the rest of the area, the Zimbabwe and Mozambique borders with South Africa.

Above all, the presence of terrorists and resistance movements in all four of the countries concerned makes this border area so sensitive.

It does not reduce tensions in this dangerous situation to place the blame for every incident on South Africa, as Zimbabwe has now done once more. Under the prevailing circumstances, the Limpopo region is a dangerous area which can destabilize the entire district. And all four countries would suffer from that, our three neighboring states probably the worst.

The reasonable action would be for the four governments to come together to try to devise a method to defuse the situation.

Relations with Mauritius

Johannesburg DIE VADERLAND in Afrikaans 14 Nov 83 p 10

[Editorial: "Mauritius and South Africa"]

[Text] With a Mauritius which even sends its Minister of Labor to South Africa, drops its claims to Diego Garcia and admits that it is dependent on South Africa, a new period in the relations between Port Louis and Pretoria must begin.

To be sure, the minister in question, Mr Herve Duval, designates his visit as "unofficial", but it is nevertheless one at which important matters are to be discussed, especially concerning money.

The truth is that most things which Mauritius has to buy abroad can be bought cheaper in South Africa than elsewhere.

Mr. Duval has even stated that he intends to ask the South African government whether unemployed skilled workers from Mauritius, such as teachers and masons, can come to work in South Africa on a contract basis.

In Sri Lanka, the Prime Minister of Mauritius, Mr Aneerood Jugnauth, also said that "some" citizens of his country have already moved to South Africa.

Such things do not take place between two countries which are truly hostile toward each other. And, besides Durban, Mauritius is certainly the South Africans' favorite vacation spot. That is, of the percentage of those who can afford to fly there.

Mauritius' recent ouvertures are however of utmost importance for South Africa if one considers the fact that that country is a member of the Organization of African Unity as well as of the Commonwealth.

(It would be interesting to hear Mauritius' standpoints at the Commonwealth deliberations in India.)

All of this is just an aside. Mauritius is also of great importance to South Africa as a landing place for its airplanes to and from Australia.

For South Africa, this country is also a desirable link to the Third World, from which we have become totally isolated, with few exceptions (an embassy in Malawi and a trade mission in Harare).

The new rapprochement between the two countries thus should not only be regarded from the economic angle, but also the value it has for South Africa to establish closer relations with a non-European country must be taken into consideration.

Relations with Taipei

Pretoria DIE VOLKSBLAD in Afrikaans 9 Nov 83 p 12

[Editorial: "A Good Friend"]

[Text] A personal note elsewhere in the newspaper reports that Dr Nak van der Merwe, Minister of Health and Welfare, arrives in Taipei today on a visit to the Republic of China. Another report tells of the fruitful visit of a scholar from the University of Bloemfontein to the island of Taiwan.

Such visits are not extraordinary or rare. The exchange between these two republics of politicians, scholars, businessmen and persons who influence public opinion in every conceivable area is probably more extensive than that between South Africa and many Western countries, and more extensive than many South Africans realize.

This exchange indicates a growing friendship and a mutually enriching relationship of cooperation and trust, rooted in a strong aversion to communism in both countries, similar rejection by a large number of countries in the world, and the same commitment to economic and military readiness in order to ensure security and stability.

The special relationship to the unusual Chinese island power--small but tenacious--includes incalculable strategic advantages for South Africa and its people. It is a relationship which no one who is genuinely concerned about his country's welfare and security would ever wish to attack or strain by any means.

Yet many persons are unclear or even negative about the place of the Chinese in South African society. Incidents such as the one last year at Harrismith when, after a painful struggle, the decision about admitting a Chinese girl to a white school went back and forth, and the continued existence of an offensive old Free-State law which prevents normal relations are examples of anachronisms which are unhealthy for the development of even closer alliances.

South Africans who resoundingly said yes to a social order which opens the door to new points of view in national relations would obviously welcome the elimination of obstructions to natural interaction between South Africans and their Chinese friends. This should be an impetus to the Government to do right away what is right in moral and other regards.

U.S. Government Attitude

Capetown DIE BURGER in Afrikaans 22 Nov 83 p 18

[Editorial: "Reason to Defend South Africa"]

[Text] For the second time in a week, the American government has requested in the UN that South Africa be given the chance and the time to bring about peaceful change. This is encouraging for South Africa, in view of the growing pressure from the left in that country to even impose sanctions against the republic.

But it is also important to South Africa in another regard. The policy of "constructive involvement" has always had the condition that there must be signs in South Africa of advancement on the road to a better, more just social order. Now that the white voters have overwhelmingly said yes to reform in the referendum, the American government has a reason to defend and support South Africa.

This process works in both directions. A positive attitude and confidence elicits a positive reaction and confidence. The best example of this in recent time was the positive speech given by Mr Lawrence Eagleburger, American undersecretary of state, in San Francisco before the referendum. In that speech he said among other things that the new South African constitution is "the first step being taken to extend national political rights to others than the white minority", and he also acknowledged other steps such as the extension of home ownership, union rights and more and improved education.

This positive attitude of the American government has not only led to a better feeling between the two governments, but also in all likelihood had a positive effect on the referendum. This was the antithesis of all the negative destructive criticism from the left. In that way, we believe, the American policy was helpful in bringing South Africa closer to a solution of its problems.

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CSO: 3401/27

BISHOP TUTU PREDICTS BLEAK YEAR OF CONFRONTATION AHEAD

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 29 Dec 83 p 2

[Article by Sam Mabe]

[Text]

BISHOP Desmond Tutu, of the South African Council of Churches, has predicted that the year 1984 is going to see intensified worker resistance, State and church confrontation and an increase in the number of bomb blasts.

Speaking earlier this week before leaving for the USA where he is to receive an honorary doctorate, the bishop predicted a bleak year for blacks, whom he said should expect more forced removals, a rise in transport costs and an increase in the general sales tax.

He said a rise in the cost of living would be influenced by the price of gold which has not gone up in the past few weeks. This, he added, could increase tension in the townships.

Bishop Tutu said South Africa, enjoying the support of the US Government, will continue bullying southern African states following the pattern of the Israeli Government.

With the Reagan administration having up to the end of the year in power, the end of 1984 will certainly find South Africa still firmly settled in Namibia. The bishop said it would be a remarkable performance

on the part of South Africa if she were to move out of Namibia in 1984.

He added that the South African Government had become intransigent over Namibia because the US Government was providing her with excuses to drag her feet and delay a settlement.

The year will start with the publication of the report of the Eloff Commission of Inquiry into the SACC and that may set the scene for a continuing feud between the State and the church.

There would be some areas in which the churches will find it difficult to limit themselves to making public statements of condemnation only. The bishop predicted firm church action on matters relating to the Mixed Marriages Act, conscientious objection, forced removals and the Namibian atrocities.

Trade unions will grow in strength and effectiveness and will be

subjected to close attention by the authorities. The United Democratic Front (UDF) is also going to show increasing strength and to a lesser degree, the National Forum.

The violence similar to that which claimed five lives at the University of Zululand in October may repeat itself unless a lot of understanding and restraint is shown.

Bishop Tutu said authorities would have to appoint blacks who are much more representative in the community to serve on the councils of black universities. Staff compositions at the universities should also show that the universities are, indeed, black institutions.

Bishop Tutu also said he did not think that people elected to serve in local governments under the Black Local Authorities Act would respond to calls by some sections of the community to resign.

UNITA SUCCESS PUTS LUANDA 'IN SERIOUS TROUBLE'

MB061857 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1600 GMT 6 Jan 84

[Station commentary: "The UNITA Factor"]

[Text] It has become known as the UNITA factor, and it is the issue to which the least attention is being given as efforts continue to bring about a cease-fire in the so-called operational area. It can virtually be said the demands by the Soviet Union for a South African troop withdrawal from Angola, South African and Angolan suggestions for a cease-fire, SWAPO calls for direct talks to negotiate a cease-fire--these can all be relegated to mere academic discussion while the UNITA factor is ignored.

Foreign Minister Pik Botha put this issue into perspective today when he said that the basic source of the conflict in Angola would not be resolved until the Angolan Government made peace with UNITA. In the past 8 years, the power of UNITA has escalated in leaps and bounds. In November last year, it issued a 4-mongh ultimatum to the Luanda Government: Either the MPLA initiate peace talks leading to elections under control of the OAU or the United Nations, or UNITA would begin directing its forces in a concerted way against the capital city of Luanda.

And, indeed, UNITA has become a formidable force. Latest estimates are that UNITA has above 35,000 fighting men and is recruiting new troops at a rate of 2,000 a year. The resistance movement is said to control up to 40 percent of the country, and most of Angola is today regarded as unstable. The MPLA's military wing, FAPLA, is said to have only 33,000 men. Of course, it does have the assistance of some 30,000 Cubans, but these characters mainly look after key towns, leaving it to the FAPLA forces to do the risky work of seeking out UNITA in the bush. It is an impossible task in an impossible terrain, which in size is slightly larger than all of South Africa.

Repeatedly, UNITA leader Dr Jonas Savimbi's overtures have been rejected by Dos Santos regime. Observers, therefore, believe that this could be UNITA's final offer before Dr Savimbi goes all out for the main objective, namely control over Angola and not just the southern region.

Several African correspondents report that some frontline African state leaders have already written off the MPLA as a reliable future partner in the region.

Certainly, all agree that the MPLA government is becoming desperate. Perhaps in the final analysis, therefore, this is why the Soviet Union and the Angolan Government are now accusing South Africa of manipulating and assisting in bringing about the overthrow of the existing Angolan Government. We are a convenient scapegoat for a government which is in serious trouble.

CSO: 3400/485

ROAD TO 'DIFFERENT KIND' OF AFRIKANERDOM VIEWED

Direction of Afrikanerdom

[Pretoria BEELD in Afrikaans 18 Nov 83 p 10]

[Article by Willie Kühn in the column "Political Scene"]

[Text] One-stop service they call it in the business world. Step in through these doors, and all of your needs will be taken care of. You can count on... Of course, you remember which bank offered a kind of alternative, all-inclusive banking service a few years back, complete with red carpets, potted plants and relaxing music.

That is way things are happening nowadays in Afrikaner circles. A political movement has assumed a form that intends to be much more than just politics. It wants to be a one-stop service for Afrikanerdom.

You see, an alternative type of Afrikanerdom is on its way. That is why it is not sufficient to found a Conservative Party [CP] or a Reconstituted National Party (HNP). There must also be provisions made for the Afrikaner in student and youth groups, in cultural and religious organizations.

Tactics

That is what the right-wing of Afrikaner politics is working towards.. that is, if whispers in political circles can be understood correctly.

In the final analysis there is by no means a need to doubt intentions and goals. It has been clear for a long time what the tactics are, especially those of the CP: try to take over the train (as Dr Andries Treurnicht has so graphically put it on occasion, according to witnesses).

And if the engineer hears the hijackers approaching just in time? Then--as the handbook of far-right action declares--an attempt is to be made to derail the train, a new train is to be set into motion and all potential passengers are to be informed that this is the only true, safe means of transportation.

Destruction

Those who think that the above is idle chatter would do well to consider how the members of the CP tried to take over the National Party [NP] while they were still members of it. There were secret meetings, lengthy discussions to create the impression of pure adherence to principles and selected power showdowns with selected ministers.

But when nothing came of it, they then broke away, they attempted to destroy their old party and offer a new political vehicle.

Old news, to be sure, but it is news that renews itself. For the battlefield has changed, but the tactics and approach remain the same.

Rumors

Just look at how the far-rightwingers are constantly maneuvering to obtain new spheres of influence. The Broederbond is a recent example. Apparently there were serious attempts to take over that organization (an abomination to some, the holy grail of Afrikanerdom for others).

The last couple of years there were rumors that there was a quiet struggle behind the scenes to take over the Broederbond and the Ruiterswag. Of course it had to be a quiet struggle, since confidential organizations operate in the wings, with muted passions, not in the floodlights of the stage.

And when it became obvious that the far-rightwingers would not prevail? Then came the so-called shock resignation of Prof Carel Boshoff, along with report that there were plans either to take over the Ruiterswag or to found a new, alternative Broederbond.

Maneuvering

Can you discern the pattern, the philosophy that tries to take complete care of a certain kind of Afrikaner?

Just look at the maneuvering in other Afrikaner cultural organizations to try to carry out a coup among the officers or by obtaining a majority. There are the FAK [Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Organizations], the Rapportryers etc. No wonder that vice-president Alwyn Schlebusch recently warned against the tendency to displace the political battle to other Afrikaner institutions.

The last--and most amazing--one is the church. Even in that context there are whispers of plans being made and new alignments that could arise.

Risks

In many areas, it is said, heads are being counted and lists of names are being compiled. Since the referendum, the far-rightwingers have obviously been attempting to survey their position with regard to how many, where and what

next, so that they can determine their future strategy; Dr Treurnicht, leader of the CP, has stated clearly that he does not accept what happened on November 2.

Thus we can expect the CP to consider calculated risks such as: should an attempt be made to take over the FAK entirely? Should the Broederbond be abandoned in favor of a new organization which will be entirely a prop of party politics? And so on.

Church

With mounting concern Afrikaners are justified in asking: is this truly necessary?

Must the Afrikaner people be torn apart because there is a minority group--yes, the referendum has demonstrated that they are a minor minority--which refuses to accept reality and wants to either have its way or sow discord?

Somewhere there must remain meeting places. Church and cultural organizations cannot turn into a palpitating piece of politics.

Grace

Do the rightwingers want to drive a wedge into and abandon the few institutions they support which are common to all? What service will they be performing for the cause which they so ardently proclaim?

Perhaps it is now time for the splinter groups to reconsider their position before the damage is irreparable. Accept the differences of opinion among Afrikaners, but also accept the fact that there are other tasks than political crusades.

Moreover, they must learn to accept defeat graciously. When standpoints are rejected at the ballot box or wherever the decision is made, democracy demands that the will of the majority be respected. Can the CP members claim in all honesty that their actions do not resemble the desire for revenge of poor losers? Does this not constitute an open mockery of those so-called ideals?

Before the right-wingers go any farther with their creation of a structure for an alternative Afrikanerdom, perhaps they should consider once more whether the damage to the Afrikaner may be greater than the gains. The months of political relaxation ahead can well be used to draw up the balance sheet. Perhaps...perhaps the realization will prevail that the common grounds which still exist must be guarded jealously.

For a change the key question must not be "Quo vadis, Afrikaner people?", but rather "Quo vadis, right-wingers, with the Afrikaner people?"

Interview with Buthelezi

Pretoria BEELD in Afrikaans 14 Nov 83 p 9

[Interview by Pieter Cronjé: "If He Could, Gatsha Would Fight Again for a Vote of No"]

[Text] Captain Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, head minister of the KwaZulu, according to government policy the leader of about six million Zulus, president of Inkatha, which claims 750,000 members, and president of the Black Alliance, was the black leader who fought the hardest for a vote of no. He was frequently in the news about what many interpreted as threats to whites, Indians and coloreds, his participation, along with the Progressive Federal Party, in the campaign for a no, and his sharp denunciation of the new constitution. He gives his vision in this interview with PIETER CRONJE, Editor for Southern Africa.

Captain Gatsha Buthelezi still believes that the new constitution will increase tensions between white and black and between black and black, but does not intend to continue his active campaign for a no vote in the recent referendum among the colored and Indian communities.

He also says that if he were to lead that campaign again, he would have to do exactly the same in order to retain his credibility among the ranks of the blacks.

He regards the new constitution as a watershed in which whites, coloreds and Indians will collaborate to exclude blacks from the only significant kind of say in government: decision-making in the central parliament.

Here is an edited version of the interview at Ulundi.

[Question] Where does South Africa stand and how does the future look after the referendum?

[Answer] As someone who believes in a future brought about by negotiation and peaceful change, I am extremely concerned. The referendum and the new constitution has weakened the position of leaders like me who believe in non-violent strategies. It has lent more credibility to my critics in the black community who claim that problems can only be solved by violence. The constitution excludes us and "denationalizes" us. I have nothing to say to young people who ask me what kind of future there is for negotiations.

[Question] Do you think that the colored and Indian communities will participate?

[Answer] Undoubtedly, despite a strong opposition in both communities.

[Question] Do you intend to discourage the colored and Indian communities from participating in the new division?

[Answer] I have made my standpoint clear, to the Indian council, among others. I do not regard it as my task to carry on a campaign among them. If I am asked, I will repeat my message.

[Question] Don't you think that you threatened the whites, coloreds and Indians against participation?

[Answer] What did I threaten them with? I am not even armed, and I do not lead armed people. I do not see how I can threaten whites who are armed to the teeth, I still do not believe in violence. I merely said that my people's anger can explode because they are excluded. Perhaps more blacks may leave the country now.

To the colored and Indians I only said that the constitution is a recipe for conflict. Blacks will be hurt if coloreds and Indians, whom they regard as their brothers, become junior partners in the system of suppression of blacks.

I know my people and I work among them. Just as in March 1976, when I felt the approach of and predicted that the June riots were coming, I now feel that the new division will bring more conflict between white and black and between black and black.

[Question] What non-violent strategies remain?

[Answer] There are many possibilities which blacks have not yet used, such as their power as workers and as consumers.

[Question] You once said that you would revise your stand on the withdrawal of foreign investment in the event of a strong yes-vote. What now?

[Answer] I realize that disinvestment cannot topple the government and that it would mean hardships for my people, but it remains a possible non-violent strategy.

[Question] If you could choose again, would you carry on a similar campaign for a no-vote?

[Answer] Certainly. I can do nothing else and still maintain my credibility among my people. As I already said, blacks regard the constitution as rejection of them by white South Africa, just like what happened in 1910 with the marriage of convenience between the Boers and the British.

[Question] Wasn't the referendum merely a matter which concerned the whites?

[Answer] Only people who live in a paradise of fools claim that. I am a South African and, like it or not, I will be governed by the constitution. Black interests are represented by the executive president.

[Question] Didn't your participation influence the voters in Natal to vote yes?

[Answer] I think that is pure nonsense. Napoleon said that the English are a nation of shopkeepers. That is true of the English-speakers in Natal. English-speakers in the country do not dirty their hands with politics as long as their businesses are safe. When some large industrialists like Mr Chris Saunders went out of their way to work for a yes-vote, the outcome was clear.

Other reasons for the yes-vote were the Government's very effective advertising for a yes-vote on SATV [South African Television], the claim that someone intended to attempt to assassinate the Prime Minister in Pietermaritzburg, and the African National Congress' [ANC] call for a no-vote. I wish the ANC had not done that. By doing so, they worked for a yes-vote. Few whites would wish to be in the same camp as the ANC.

[Question] Will you contribute to the work of the Cabinet committee investigating the position of "city blacks"?

[Answer] I am not willing to discuss constitutional matters with the committee. During the referendum I was not given the opportunity to present my views on SATV. That was despite an official request by the commissioner-general for such an opportunity after the Prime Minister's attacks on me at the NP convention at George. I never received an answer.

I also do not see why I should discuss other matters with the committee. What good would it do me? I was attacked by other black organizations when Inkatha testified on the President's Council and me before the Steyn commission. To judge by the rhetoric about the committee, I do not think that it really has anything to offer blacks.

[Question] How are relations between you, the Government, the Prime Minister, and Dr Piet Koornhoff these days?

[Answer] They have never been worse. I told Dr Koornhoff that it is not advisable for him or any other minister to come to Ulundi for the opening of the Legislative Assembly, and he agreed. I do not want a reoccurrence of what happened during his last visit about the Inguavuma matter. (Dr Koornhof was threatened by angry mobs.) The commissioner-general had to open the session. This is an important session--the first in the new building. Since February 1980 I have not met the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister insulted me deeply, more than Mr John Vorster ever did, especially by saying that my position was created by the Government. By doing so he used the rhetoric of the African National Congress and my critics in the black community and lent it credence by implying that I am his straw man.

[Question] You always have to negotiate with the Prime Minister. Couldn't your attacks on him strain future negotiations?

[Answer] Our relationship could not be worse than it already is. We were both created in God's image. I have the same right to attack him as he does to attack me. I am not offensive by nature, but if I am attacked and insulted, I will strike back.

[Question] Doesn't this put you in a more vulnerable position than other black leaders who do not have to negotiate with the Government?

[Answer] I do not care about them. Let them negotiate with him. I am sure that they will come back empty-handed.

[Question] Is Inkatha going to participate in the first-day elections for black local governments?

[Answer] Not this time. The only reason is the Government's information paper which implies that blacks are getting local governments in lieu of participation in parliament. Dr Koornhoff has promised to request Minister Chris Heunis to repudiate that standpoint. If local governments are represented as part of constitution "package deal", we cannot be involved in them.

[Question] Won't your support in the cities suffer if Inkatha does not participate in local governments?

[Answer] I believe not. My support in cities and rural areas is not the result of participation in community councils. I do not argue with those who wish to participate nor do I insult them. I am not opposed to participation per se.

[Question] Isn't the ANC taking over your support in municipal areas?

[Answer] Why should I say that? Inkatha's membership has increased phenomenally in the last three years. My support has not decreased.

[Question] How do you feel about the criticism of Inkatha in the black community following the occurrences at the University of Zululand?

[Answer] Was there criticism in the black community? I only know of criticism by our political enemies like the United Democratic Front, the Azanian Student's Organization and consciousness groups who attack us anyway and who were behind the incident. It was political orchestration and not an isolated incident. [Inkatha supporters and anti-Inkatha students came to blows: five died and many were wounded.] The political campaign against me and Inkatha has been going on for some time.

When I received my honorary degree, my and my mother's car was stoned and I was cursed. The same thing happened when I was appointed chancellor. My supporters saved my honor and that of the king that day. What else could they do when the others said "Gatsha is a k..., Gatsha is a dog"? What do they expect from Zulus?

[Photo captions]

Captain Gatsha Buthelezi... "I have nothing to tell young people about what future there is for negotiations.

Mr P.W. Botha... "Our relationship cannot be worse than it already is," Captain Buthelezi said."

English Community Following the Referendum

Johannesburg RAPPORT in Afrikaans 13 Nov 83 p 14

[Article by Prof Lawrence Schlemmer in the column "Focal Commentary": "New Role for the English following the Referendum"]

[Text] To a great extent, the referendum diverted the spotlight from the Afrikaans to the English-speaking voters. There is great uncertainty about the future voting behavior among the English. It seems that the "decisive vote" in our politics will mainly consist of English speakers.

A recent poll which was taken in cooperation with Market and Opinion Polls (Edms.) Ltd. points to a dramatic new change in our politics and to a new role for the English speakers.

More than three out of ten English speakers now supports the National Party, and this percentage could possibly grow. It has also occurred before that a third of the English supported the government, but this time the kind of support is different.

While in the past the English-speaking NP-vote was mainly conservative, we now see that this support was clearly progressive. My nation-wide poll shows that over five out of ten English NP-supporters would accept changes in the Group Regions [Homelands] Law and that six out of ten would like to see the Immorality Law disappear.

Roughly three-fourths of the English NP-supporters would accept participation in the decision-making process by colored, Indians /and/ [boldface] blacks with the proviso that there be guarantees against majority domination.

Are these progressive English-speaking NP-supporters different from the Progressive Federal Party and the New Republic Party? The only really clear difference resulting from my poll is that the English NP-people are very enthusiastically patriotic. Foreign pressure on the Republic of South Africa will cause reactions among these voters identical to those of Afrikaners--resistance and solidarity.

From such findings as well as from my own observations among English-speaking groups, it appears that an NP which projects a clear picture of reform will be able to count on a significant English-speaking vote.

Nevertheless, there will always be a majority of English speakers which will remain fervent supporters of the opposition.

There is a small and decreasing number of English conservatives which are both anti-black and anti-Afrikaans, and they will certainly be in a political desert until they die out.

Especially in Natal there is a significant group which is concerned with maintaining the special character of the province. If the Government institutes a serious program of decentralized local control of cultural affairs and education, this group would probably eagerly seize the opportunity and many of them will then lend their support to the NP.

There also are groups especially among the youth, which are rather apathetic and apolitical in their thinking.

The most important political group among the English speakers, however, is the one that proclaims a rational "conviction about the future". Although they usually support liberal viewpoints and accept the leadership of liberal-minded persons, they are not entirely liberal in ideology. Their views are often based on very practical analysis of political questions. They are bitterly dissatisfied with government policies which in their opinion are not realizable in practice.

They believe that there will have to be some form of sharing of power between blacks and whites in the long run. They would like to see a policy which accepts that reality now, while whites still have the power and influence to set up and manage the new system in an orderly fashion.

In the foreseeable future, this group will remain very critical of government policy. This critical attitude must not be misunderstood. Frequently the severe criticism of protest groups creates the impression that there is a hostility among the English opposition groups toward reasonable white conservatism and Afrikaner cultural efforts. This is not the case.

My research clearly shows that the "determined" English opposition has quite a bit of appreciation for Mr P.W. Botha's reform attempt, and that they are just as determined as NP-people to oppose unreasonable expectations of a white surrender. Such people live mainly in parts of the country where economy and social structure are such that white and black cannot be separated from each other without creating serious alienation and frustration.

As Marxists frequently very critically put it, their political endeavor is merely to maintain stability by systematically coopting blacks.

The role of the English in politics is very interesting for two reasons. First of all, the progressive English-speaking element within the NP will

ultimately be able to contribute to the debate on reform within the party. The government will also be very dependent on that group for support when a program of decentralization of power to local governments and territories is begun.

Secondly, the role of the opposition is clearer than ever before. First and foremost it concerns the future of blacks in our politics. If the NP can accept the fact that the English-speaking opposition is not irresponsible in this regard, but rather has a very practical attitude, opportunities will arise for a fruitful and dynamic interaction between the government and the opposition.

[Caption under photograph:] Prof Schlemmer is the Director of the Center for Applied Social Studies at the University of Natal.

On Future Role of Colored

Johannesburg RAPPORT in Afrikaans 20 Nov 83 p 16

[Article by Gus Adams, pseudonym of a well-known colored scholar: "It is Time for Politicians to Talk"]

Great things are in the air! Discussions everywhere. Left, right, center. It is in Pretoria, Durban, Capetown: everyone wants to have his say. About what? To decide whether referendums will be held, to decide what everyone knows has already been decided for a long time.

Who's kidding whom? Two points are crystal-clear: The new constitution will be implemented. Point number two: all the colored political parties will participate. You don't have to be a genius (or even a politician) to draw the necessary conclusions from that.

It is quite interesting to see that the newspapers which so zealously campaigned for a no-vote now are beating the drums for brown and Indian referendums. While they missed the bet with the whites, they now get two new chances with the coloreds and the Indians. But whether such politicking will yield anything for us is another matter.

Let us leave that aside. This column does not wish to get bogged down in such fruitless discussion. It is now time again for us to remind our politicians that politics involves matters touching on the vital interests of the people. We want to hear what they have to tell us about the issues of the day.

What is their policy on matters such as housing, employment programs, participation in unions, transportation between home and workplace, health and education?

I want to elaborate on one example. One of the "individual matters" which will fall under the authority of the Colored Chamber is health. Among other

things, the following are specifically mentioned: hospitals, clinics, medical services at school and for the needy, information on health and nutrition, and the registration of private hospitals. All these matters are listed on the schedule which determines what are individual matters and they are subject to any general legislation in this regard.

Since the leaders of the Labor Party, the Freedom Party and the Democratic Party have all announced that they intend to participate in the social order, it is not unwarranted to ask them to consider these questions of health care. What is their policy in this matter? What can we expect from them if they are allowed to carry that policy out? What new legislation are they planning?

It is generally known that our colored residential areas are extremely hard-pressed for doctors and medical services. How are these problems going to be confronted?

This question is raised here because the temptation will be very great for coloreds who assume positions of power to simply perpetuate the the old order as they used to. Perhaps a bit more of this and a bit less of that, but basically the same old recipe. The mixture as before, as the doctors have always said.

There is a lot of talk about leadership and about the caliber of men who now must step forward. Still, if this only means that the man in authority has a darker skin than the one who used to be in that position, then it has not advanced us at all. And that is why I am looking for a new light, thus far to no avail.

Let me consider my own profession, education. It happens so often that a new principal is hired. His first step is to move into his new office, buy new furniture and an intercom, and then to sit down in his new chair... and there he sits, until one day he retires. Nothing new has come from him.

This is also the danger in politics. A brown man becomes a member of the Council of Ministers in the House of Representatives. He sits behind the big desk, in the fancy armchair, drives a shiny car. But the real decision making and the action on matters ultimately takes place among the top officials, and they remain white. They are the men who ultimately steer the car according to the policies set down in writing... and it was not the brown man who set them down. From time to time the brown official is allowed to appear in public, even to be a bit critical. But not to make a significant impact on policy.

Are we on the road to something like that with this new social order?

12571

CSO: 3401/24

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURAL LAND TO BLACK HOMELANDS--South Africa has ceded more agricultural land to Venda, Ciskei, Transkei and Bophuthatswana. According to notices in the latest government gazette, a portion of the Maclear District, comprising about nine farms, and a part of the Indwe District in the eastern cape shall be incorporated into the Transkei, while a tract of land in the Fort Beaufort vicinity will become part of the Ciskei. In addition, several farms in the Soutpansberg District have been added to Venda, and Bophuthatswana has received additional land in the districts of Vryburg and Rustenburg. [Text] [MB061922 Johannesburg Domestic Service in Afrikaans 1400 GMT 6 Jan 83]

CSO: 3400/485

VARIOUS DIFFICULTIES SAID LEADING TO ANARCHY

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English No 22, 2 Nov 83 pp 3-5

[Article: "Uganda: Northern Quagmire"]

[Text]

The 5,000 square mile area encompassing the extreme south of Sudan, the north-western corner of Uganda and the north-eastern corner of Zaire, is an extraordinary area of guerrillas, commodity and arms traffic, gold smuggling, refugees, multinational agencies, death and intrigue. This week the Sudanese foreign ministry hosted a meeting in Khartoum including the foreign ministers of Zaire, Uganda and the **Central African Republic**.

For Zairois the area provides a market-place and a living, but is too remote to be of consequence to the Zairean government. For President **Milton Obote's** government in Uganda it is important: anti-government guerrillas in West Nile province, contrary to earlier reports (AC Vol 24 No 11), have successfully attacked several government army (UNLA) forward posts close to the Sudanese border. There is a continued possibility of cooperation between the West Nile guerrillas and the main anti-Obote guerrilla group, the *National Resistance Army* (NRA). And with the rapidly deteriorating security situation in southern Sudan (AC Vol 24 No 21) the possibilities for cooperation between the Ugandan guerrillas and the southern Sudanese *Anyanya II* guerrillas will be increased.

For Khartoum the area does not yet represent any one pressing danger. However, a widening of southern Sudanese armed resistance to include the Taposa and Latuka tribes of eastern Equatoria would automatically create a bigger demand for small-arms in southern Sudan. Uganda's pool of AK-47s would become the obvious supply line.

Military dispositions in West Nile

In December 1982 and January 1983 UNLA launched a major offensive against *Uganda National*

Rescue Front (UNRF) guerrillas in Aringa and Obongi counties of West Nile province. Many civilians were killed, villages were occupied and in some cases razed and probably several thousand people were taken into army-controlled camps akin to those in Luwero district to the north of Kampala - AC Vol 24 No 12. (The "camps" include the hospital at Yumbe and the barracks at Moyo, Koboko and Lodonga). During the offensive about 25,000 Ugandans crossed to Sudan as refugees. By late February UNRF was preparing a series of counter offensives. Field reports note UNRF attacks on the following UNLA posts (estimated garrison strength in parentheses):-

- 12 March: Lobe (80)
- 26 March: Oraba (200)
- 20 April: Midigo (500) plus armoury
- 14 May: Lima (na) - supply HQ for Bondo command area.
- 7 June: Kegbura (na) - supply HQ for Moyo command area.
- 26 June: Goya (na)
- 28 August: Obongi (na)

None of the above garrisons appears to have been held by UNRF, whose objectives were to capture weapons and demoralise government forces. After a fashion government forces now "hold" a line roughly from Koboko via Yumbe to Obongi. The area to the north of this line is now largely depopulated. The only incident of note in the area to the south, as far as Pakwach, was an attack in March on the UNLA barracks at Okollo followed by UNLA reprisals in the locality.

UNLA's strategy cannot be sophisticated due to its myriad shortcomings (AC Vol 24 No 12). It cannot therefore properly control West Nile province or significantly damage UNRF. The only discernable strategy appears to be to establish more regular contact with Sudanese security officials, and traders, on the Sudanese side of the border in order to aggravate any sanctuary UNRF has there.

Since September last year UNLA has entered Kaya regularly to buy food and trade Ugandan commodities. A number of Sudanese merchants, notably Arabs, have established profitable trading businesses there. A new road has been built enabling a consistent flow of goods from Zaire and Uganda to Kaya. In December 1982 five Sudanese Arab traders were shot dead nine miles inside Uganda from Kaya at a point between two UNLA posts. (Though they were probably killed by UNLA troops, the following day a group of Arab traders, supported by colleagues from nearby Bazi, burned over 100 houses in Kaya belonging to Ugandan settlers). Clearly UNLA is in a position to control the considerable quantities of coffee, whisky, cigarettes, parafin, beer, shoes and foam mattresses which enter Sudan from Uganda,

to the mutual benefit of UNLA, Sudanese police, customs officials, and Arab traders.

However, there have been a number of fire-fights on the Sudanese side of the border in the course of "hot pursuit" by UNLA. The first documented UNLA incursion into Sudan was in April 1982 near Nimule. UNLA troops, having killed a number of civilians, fired on a Sudanese army unit. About 20 UNLA troops were captured. No further such incident appears to have occurred until March this year during the UNRF offensive. On 17 March UNLA crossed the border at Karua, killing two Sudanese and about 30 Ugandans; the following week it entered Sudan near Kaya, killing three civilians and abducting 14 Ugandans, and similarly at Morote where it killed 11 civilians. On 23 June it entered at Gboso, abducting five Ugandans; later it took 12 Ugandans from Ajio. The Sudanese army, which has garrisons at Yei, Kaya, Nimule and Kajo-Kaji, generally behaves with a decorum unrivalled by other institutions in the area. It plays a low-key role and tries to avoid conflict.

Apart from continued, if vague, efforts to extend a rudimentary intelligence network among Ugandans in southern Sudan, there do not appear to have been any notable incidents in July and August. Then in mid-September a small group of Ugandans, presumed to be working for the Ugandan government, crossed into Sudan at Kajo-Kaji and went to the Mogiri refugee settlement camp, where they attempted to persuade the refugee authorities to hand over a number of alleged guerrillas who had sought sanctuary as refugees.

A complication for the Ugandan government is the large degree of tribal affinity between West Nile province and southern Sudan. UNRF until recently was composed of Madi people, accounting for about half the guerrillas, Lubara people about a third and Aringa the remainder. (The Lubara element has dwindled of late because of differences with Maj. **Amin Onzi**, the UNRF leader, who is Aringa). Madi-speaking people in particular have a lot of connections in southern Sudan.

Then there is a pool of ex-Idi Amin supporters and henchmen² in southern Sudan. As has been well-documented, an important reason for Amin's ability to stay in power was his reliance on southern Sudanese in senior posts in his security organisations. Most of them were from the small Kakwa tribe (his own tribe), which is more numerous in Sudan than Uganda. Other Sudanese props came from the Madi, Bari and Acholi-speaking people.

Until early 1982 there were undoubtedly substantial connections between UNRF, which was then led by Brig. **Moses Ali**, Amin's former finance minister,

and coveted by the pro-Amin group in southern Sudan. But following Ali's departure for a commercial career (his family appears to be in Pakistan) in the Middle and Near-East, UNRF has made an effort to distance itself from the Amin group. The stigma remains at least a propaganda weapon for the Ugandan government.

UNRF outlook

The battle between UNRF and UNLA is now in stalemate. UNRF inevitably gets some support from among the 300,000 Ugandan refugees and settlers in southern Sudan, but it is isolated from the rest of Uganda and boxed in on its eastern flank by the Nile, and bedevilled, equally inevitably, by internal dissension with the leadership of Amin Onzi.

There are two connected possibilities for UNRF to expand from its hit-and-run tactics and from its confinement to the northern swathe of West Nile province:

a) A change of leadership. There is some talk that Maj. Gen. **Emilio Mondo**, Idi Amin's former secretary of defence who broke from UNRF last year to join the new *Uganda Democratic Redemption Unit* (UDRU), might usurp Amin Onzi. Though Mondo's association with Amin invites some criticism, he is a popular figure in the north. More important, from his present base in Nairobi, he appears to be on good terms with Yoweri Museveni, leader of the NRA. So far contact between the NRA and UNRF have resulted only in gestures. (We understand, for instance, that an NRA representative was present during UNRF's attack on Midigo in April).

b) Better leadership of UNRF, including liaison with the NRA and southern Sudanese guerrillas, could enable UNRF to establish itself on the east bank of the Nile. A conceivable grand strategy could then be to capture Kitgum as a prelude to linking up with the NRA for an assault on the strategically placed town of Gulu. Given the incompetence of UNLA this is not as far-fetched as it may seem. The population on the east bank of the Nile (Madi, Nubians and a few Aringa and Acholi) would be sympathetic to such a scheme.

Superimposed on all this, but as a result of it, are the about 300,000 Ugandan refugees in southern Sudan, at least 100,000 of whom have settled there and are not officially registered as refugees. In September there were 62,000 refugees registered at Yei, 12,000 at Kajo-Kaji and 21,000 at Yei refugee transit camp. But in the Yei river district the total population is about 380,000 of whom only about 150,000 are Sudanese. An increasing number of Ugandans, especially Kakwa and experienced traders, have integrated with local Sudanese. Many of them have settled at established trading centres (Morubo, Bazi and Kaya for instance); they have also created new market-places, notably at Panyume, Morote and Ojiga.

From May to August, in the aftermath of the UNRF offensive and the subsequent UNLA reprisals, about 10,000 new Ugandan refugees were registered monthly by the *United Nations High*

Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in southern Sudan. In fact many of those who registered with UNHCR had been in Sudan for some time but had avoided registration until they had sold animals they had brought with them. Others had trekked back into Uganda to tend crops they had planted earlier, only to find in many cases that the local drought had desecrated much of the land.

The influx came at a bad time: food supplies in the refugee settlement camps were critically low; trucks of World Food Programme food coming from Kenya were stuck in a stretch of mud in Uganda not far from the Sudanese border (the Ugandan government showed little inclination to pull them out); and UNHCR, in its enthusiasm to repatriate refugees against the odds, in June began to repatriate Ugandans to West Nile province.

The food crisis, though it could reoccur, seems to have passed without much multi-lateral assistance. Repatriation, however, is still planned by UNHCR, despite the well-documented state of anarchy in West Nile province. In mid-September, for instance, about 150 Ugandans were due to be repatriated. The Ugandan government then said that the UNHCR representative from Arua could not meet the repatriates at the border. A suggestion to take them via Zaire was declined for security reasons, and eventually the exercise was postponed. Even if they had managed to pass unscathed to their "destination" in Uganda, repatriates in the past have been given basic food supplies for three months. Given that they have to build houses, grow crops and suffer the constant intimidation and theft of UNLA, their chances of survival in Uganda would have been minimal. Predictably, many of the 120 or so repatriates who returned to Uganda earlier have now trekked back to Sudan.

On one level the repatriation exercise is a misconceived idea to promote the idea that Uganda is stable enough for refugees to return. It is also symptomatic of UNHCR's huge amorphous bureaucracy of career "refugee executives", who are open to intergovernmental political manipulation.

Connected partly to this sort of intrigue and partly to the ambitions of ex-Amin opportunists, is the affair of the *Uganda Refugee Welfare Association* (URWA). In January 1981 a number of Ugandans in Sudan, under the chairmanship of **Nasuru Okuti** and including **Juma Oris**, Amin's former foreign affairs minister who now lives in Juba, and **John Yebuga**, an assistant social worker for the *Sudan Council of Churches*, met the Sudanese minister for internal affairs to discuss the establishment of URWA. Little of substance happened until November 1982 when a meeting of Ugandans involved in

URWA was called to elect an executive committee for the association. Juma Oris, contrary to his expectation, failed to be elected.

It was then alleged that Juma Oris, who has for long maintained close contacts with the Sudanese State Security Organisation (SSO), and its local director, Gassim Yacoub, was involved in a plan to send surreptitiously Ugandan refugees to fight for Iraq against Iran. The plan entailed persuading refugees to go to Saudi Arabia for a short military training course prior to their promised return to fight Obote's government. Instead they would have found themselves in the front-line in Iraq. John Yebuga apparently discovered the plot, to the obvious dismay of the parties involved, and has been imprisoned in Juba since February.

The following conclusions can be drawn about the region:

- Anarchy in Uganda will continue for the foreseeable future.
- The Ugandan refugee population in southern Sudan will not decrease significantly. There is no shortage of farming land in extreme southern Sudan: Ugandans will settle there in increasing numbers. As a consequence the Sudanese might from time to time react against what they might see as Ugandan domination.
- The combination of anarchy in Uganda, free-for-all in north-eastern Zaire and mounting armed conflict in southern Sudan, will preclude any inter-governmental conspiracy to seal the Uganda-Sudan border, prevent possible cooperation between Ugandan and Sudanese guerrillas or to neutralise by force the refugees out of political activity.

Footnotes

1. P.W. Iga, manager of the *Uganda Steel Corporation* in Tororo; C. Drani, former commissioner of customs, now a businessman; Mr. Kajoyingi, assistant administration secretary for Moyo district; Mr. Assusi, an engineer reportedly from Embu in Kenya; and a Mrs. Kupajo.
2. During the zenith of his rule Idi Amin employed over 100 high-ranking foreign officials, civilian and military, and over 4,000 NCOs and troops. Some prominent military figures such as Col. Sule, CO of the para school, and Brig. Husein Malera, army COS in 1975, have died. Others, such as Lt. Col. Faruk Minawa, director of Amin's *State Research Bureau*, are believed to live in Kenya. But a large number are living comfortably in southern Sudan. They include Lt. Col. Gore Christopher, CO of the army "suicide squad"; Capt. Nigo Nyausi, adjutant at Mubende; Brig. Taban Lupayi, CO of the marines and deputy army COS (he now lives in well-heeled and illiterate oblivion in Yei waiting for Amin's return); Lt. Ladu, CO of Uganda Airforce radar; Lt. Asu, a UAF pilot; and Elly Hassan, Amin's former ambassador to Moscow, who has recently been released from prison in Juba having been charged with possessing arms.

CSO: 3400/424 A

FORMER OFFICIAL REPORTEDLY FLEES FOR HIS LIFE

London AFRICA NOW in English No 31, Nov 83 p 44, 46-47

[Article by Richard Carver]

[Text]

Until a few weeks ago Augustine Tumusiime-Rukwira was the top government official responsible for running Kampala. As District Commissioner, he was appointed by President Milton Obote and worked as part of the President's office, responsible to Obote himself. As chairman of the Kampala security and intelligence committees he held one of the most sensitive security posts in the country.

Then, in mid-August, Tumusiime-Rukwira disappeared. There was speculation in the press and questions were asked in parliament. In October he turned up in London. He has an extraordinary tale to tell. Not only does he add to existing accounts of army indiscipline and brutality; but his case also shows that the last vestiges of political freedom are fast disappearing.

Tumusiime-Rukwira was given such a senior and trusted post because he was a long-time and loyal member of Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC). Indeed, his testimony is all the more telling because he has not gone over to any of the opposition groups, but still regards himself as a UPC member.

Tumusiime-Rukwira joined the UPC in April 1967, during Obote's first period of government. He remained in the country throughout the Amin years and gave up his post as a magistrate to stand as a UPC candidate in the 1980 general election. He fought Mpigi North-West constituency, in Buganda, though he is from Western Uganda himself. Evaristo Nyanzi, the Democratic Party candidate, won the seat and Tumusiime-Rukwira was given the Kampala post as consolation after a well-fought campaign.

What led to his downfall was his repeated opposition to excesses by members of his own party. Tumusiime-Rukwira says that there are two underlying causes of insecurity in Kampala. One is the indiscipline and violence of the army. But

the other is the fact that the headquarters of the UPC and the seat of government are in the heart of Buganda, where people are largely hostile to Obote and his party.

This problem dogged the first Obote administration in the 60s and was an important factor in the success of Idi Amin's military coup. Second time round Tumusiime-Rukwira saw the need to win the Baganda over by providing efficient and impartial administration. But the UPC leadership and many of the party — the bulk of them non-Baganda — behave like an occupying force, he says, punishing the Baganda for their failure to support the right party.

Two specific incidents were Tumusiime-Rukwira's undoing. The first was a shooting in March at a political rally in Bwaise in Kampala North constituency in which 26 people died, including three policemen. The group responsible for the killings had first been to Tumusiime-Rukwira's house in Najjanankumbi on the outskirts of the capital and killed a security guard.

The speaker on the rostrum when the killers attacked was Haji Bisase, the UPC chairman for Kampala North, but he was not harmed. In a confidential letter to the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Tumusiime-Rukwira said that Haji Bisase "could have a lot to explain about the serious acts committed by the unknown thugs."

In the letter, a copy of which went to Vice-President Paulo Muwanga, Tumusiime-Rukwira details how the Kampala North chairman had failed to cooperate with him in curbing excesses by party members. He had fixed a number of meetings but Haji Bisase had failed to turn up to any of them.

Concern focused on the activities of the UPC youth wing: "All chiefs in the area had complained that the Youth of North

Constituency under the instigation of their constituency Chairman had usurped their powers and made their administration difficult. The youth were collecting revenue and handling civil cases which were otherwise the domain of chiefs. Also, the Divisional Police Commander had complained about the activities of the youth in the division and submitted that such a development was making police work difficult."

In fact, this is something of an understatement. Youth wingers are not simply "collecting revenue" but are involved in extortion on a grand scale, kidnapping people and demanding ransoms of between shs150,000 and shs300,000. In one month recently they are reckoned to have pocketed at least shs10m.

The opposition Democratic Party has claimed that the UPC secretariat has given the youth wingers power of arrest, even though only the police can arrest people under Ugandan law, and Tumusiime-Rukwira confirms this. It is also certain that UPC youth wingers in army uniform have been setting up roadblocks. As we have reported (May 1983) a favourite youth wing method of torture is to tie the victim up in a sack, pour petrol over it and set the sack alight. The victim often escapes but with serious burns.

Tumusiime-Rukwira continued to receive complaints from parish elders about youth wingers' extortion and their arrests and threats against non-UPC members. In May he returned to the attack, this time in public.

He had been invited to instal a chief in Riubaga area and used the occasion to remind a large rally that Uganda was a multi-party state and that they were entitled to join any one of four legal political parties.

"I made it clear that there was no specific law that prevented anyone from belonging to any political party or forcing someone to join the UPC in order to remain safe or secure."

The speech was reported in the *Pilot* newspaper and Tumusiime-Rukwira was hauled up in front of Cris Rwakasiisi, the Minister of State in the President's office. Rwakasiisi was furious. "He said I was on the side of the Baganda and that I should tell them what to do in my capacity as DC instead of letting them tell me. He said I was acting as a non-UPC supporter and that I should withdraw my statement."

Tumusiime-Rukwira's retraction was duly published in the *Pilot* but the harassment and threats against him had already begun. After the attack on his house in Najjanankumbi in March, he had approached the government to be allocated an official residence nearer the centre of town where he would be safer. He was told to go to the Departed Asians' Property Custodian Board which allocated him a house in Lumumba Avenue.

After he had paid an advance of rent, but before he had moved in, Tumusiime-Rukwira was told that the house had been reallocated to the Ministry of Defence, headed by Vice-President Muwanga.

In July Tumusiime-Rukwira was allocated another house, 18 Old Kampala Road. This was dilapidated and he had to do extensive repairs at his own expense.

On the morning of August 8, shortly after he and his family had moved in, four soldiers arrived at the house. In command was Staff Sergeant Fakir, a bodyguard of the Vice-President, who told Tumusiime-Rukwira that Muwanga had said he should vacate the house immediately.

The District Commissioner showed them the allocation documents and receipts for the money he had spent. The soldiers left.

Later, when Tumusiime-Rukwira had gone to work, Fakir came back, this time with 12 men. Tumusiime-Rukwira returned to find them surrounding the house with anti-tank guns and rocket-propelled grenades.

He told them to wait and went to the Custodian Board to check if the house had been allocated to Defence. It had not, which seemed to confirm Tumusiime-Rukwira's suspicion that this was simply freelance banditry on Fakir's part. So he went on to the army headquarters where he got a letter saying that any claim to the house should be dealt with by the army command. Fakir threw away the letter and said again that he was acting on Muwanga's orders.

Tumusiime-Rukwira went to the army headquarters again and returned with two officers. When the soldiers said that they were acting under orders from the Vice-President, the officers said that there was nothing they could do.

Finally, after three attempts, Tumusiime-Rukwira got to see Muwanga. The Vice-President confirmed that the soldiers had been acting on his orders and added: "If you put up any more resistance I have ordered my men to deal with you."

Tumusiime-Rukwira left his house and moved with his large family into a small, two-roomed house.

At 6.00 the next morning he got a phone call warning that he was about to be arrested. He had scarcely left the house when a land rover full of soldiers arrived, led by Fakir. The District Commissioner's two police guards were disarmed and arrested and the soldiers went into the house. They searched the house, questioned his family and looted his property. Then they went outside and opened fire.

Tumusiime-Rukwira remained in hiding, watching. The soldiers released the two policemen and drove off.

Tumusiime-Rukwira wrote to Obote, explaining that his life was in danger and asking for protection. There was no reply.

His wife got a message that now

Tumusiime-Rukwira was wanted dead or alive. Again soldiers visited his home and office and left a message that he should contact the Vice-President. This time he did not.

Tumusiime-Rukwira managed to get hold of air tickets for Nairobi and London. Just in time he was warned that intelligence knew of his plans and that six officers were waiting on the Entebbe road to arrest him on his way to the airport. He got out of the country by another route.

His wife, sister and driver were arrested and taken to the notorious Nile Mansions, headquarters of military intelligence, for questioning. His wife and sisters were later released, but his driver, Abdu Musonera, is still being held. At one point he was in Makindye barracks and is now in Wandegaya police station.

There was some public concern over Tumusiime-Rukwira's disappearance, but this was deflected by Vice-President Muwanga's personal assurances of his "friend's" safety.

The opposition Democratic Party raised the question that if a prominent UPC member and direct representative of the President could be subjected to this sort of mistreatment, who was now safe?

The warning was timely. Since then eight Democratic Party officials have been charged with sedition for publishing a story in the weekly *Munnansi News Bulletin* claiming that starving prisoners in Luzira prison were being forced to donate blood to the nearby military hospital.

One senior Minister has warned: "If we have to fight to retain power we shall do so."

At the same time Augustine Tumusiime-Rukwira, the most senior UPC figure to warn against one-party dictatorship, has been hounded out of the country. Uganda's few remaining democratic freedom seem to be vanishing fast ●

CSO: 3400/424 A

GOVERNMENT TO REDUCE EXTERNAL DEBT ARREARS

Kampala UGANDA TIMES in English 21 Nov 83 p 8

[Article by Peter Masebu]

[Text] THE government will within the 1983-84 fiscal year reduce its external debt arrears by paying at least 20 million US dollars in cash.

During the same period it will increase its official reserves by at least 15 million US dollars, President A. Milton Obote, who is also Minister of Finance announced here on Saturday.

He was launching the Revised Recovery Programme for 1982-84 period before the UPC National Executive Committee, National Council and Parliamentary Group, at the International Conference Centre.

The cutting down of external debt arrears and boosting of official reserves, the President said, would be done through limiting of increases in the country's debt burden and borrowing on non-concessional terms.

Dr. Obote also told delegates, the government was seeking a rescheduling of immediate debt servicing of bilateral loans through the Paris Club, to give the country a debt relief.

A borrowing committee has been established in the Ministry of Finance and Bank of Uganda to review all proposed loans. "All potential lenders and borrowers are advised that unauthorised debts will not be honoured by the government, Dr. Obote told the meeting.

He said revised forecasts indicate an increase of more than 50 per cent in revenue, instead of 45 per cent as earlier projected. In this case he said, the growth rate of total expenditures, including all debt services will be contained to about 52 per cent in order to limit the overall deficits to the originally programme level.

The President told the delegates that higher revenues were expected to be realised mainly because of the dual exchange rate operations, under which the Bank of Uganda sells an average of 3 million US dollars weekly by bidding. Publicly owned firms get the foreign currency at a cheaper rate while private ones pay higher.

The government was taking steps to improve customs administration and is considering some measures to discourage the import of non-essential goods, the President said.

To improve the monitoring of aggregate expenditure levels, the government plans to close the large number of accounts at the Bank of Uganda, he added.

He said the government will provide a total of 0.65 billion Uganda Shillings to regularise known domestic debt arrears and to guarantee the payment of all other accepted claims through the issuance of short term bonds.

Vote books and commitment registers will be re-introduced for all government accounts to prevent the re-emergence of domestic debt arrears, "I wish to notify the public that any debts of supplies given to departments without proper procedure will not be honoured," the President warned.

Dr. Obote said during the execution of the recovery programme, the government will encourage banks to increase credits for financing crop marketing, imports associated with the utilisation of the International Development Association (IDA) reconstruction credits and other priority areas of economic development.

But, he said lending to commerce and trade will be strictly restrained. "These policies are expected to contain the depreciation of the exchange rate at the second window and reduce inflation rate," the President explained.

On inflation, the President informed the delegates that it had been cut from 107.2 per cent in 1980 when the UPC government took over power and was expected to stand at 25 per cent by the end of this year.

The Revised Recovery Programme, which has 105 projects compared to 76 of the earlier programme, will be presented to the next session of the National Assembly.

CSO: 3400/431

STEPS TAKEN TO REHABILITATE AILING WATER SYSTEM

London AFRICA NOW in English No 31, Nov 83 p 54

[Text]

Uganda has launched major plans to rehabilitate its dilapidated water and sewerage systems. Under the plan, to cover both urban and rural areas and to last some 10 years, it is hoped that by the end of the century every home will have access to clean drinking water.

The total cost of the project is put at around \$50m, but because of rising prices, the cost could be much higher. The secretary of the National Water and Sewerage Corporation, Ezekiel Irako, said that a consignment of pipes capable of covering more than 24km of the Kampala city water network had arrived and that the rest of the consignment, financed by the Islamic Bank, was expected later this year.

The programme of rehabilitation is being handled by three bodies. The Kampala, Entebbe and Jinja water and sewerage systems fall under the National Water and Sewerage Corporation, while the smaller towns are the responsibility of the Ministry of Lands, Water and Mineral Resources. The rural water projects will be under the Ministry of Culture and Community Development.

The rehabilitation of the Kampala water supply started with the repair of the pumping station at Gaba water works on Lake Victoria with financial assistance from the European Economic Community. But although the Gaba pumping station supplies about 15m litres of water per day, very little of it reaches the consumers because of broken pipes. In effect, the water supply has only improved marginally over what existed in 1978, when the pumping station pumped just over 4m litres per day.

Another problem is the shortage of storage tanks and constant power failures. The present plans for improving the water supply put considerable emphasis on the replacement of old pipes, construction of adequate water storage tanks and the installation of a standby power station.

In addition, the plan sees it as a priority to strengthen workshops in Kampala, Entebbe and Jinja to ensure adequate maintenance of facilities. The distribution

of water in rural areas presents a serious challenge to planners because problems facing rural areas vary in intensity and nature from one area to another. Karamoja and the surrounding districts have been identified as special cases which need urgent attention. Emergency steps have to be taken to sink boreholes and install water tanks.

The area needs an increase in its water supply of up to 70% if people are to be saved from serious water shortages. Smaller towns need improved water systems to cater for their growing populations. But since over 90% of the people live in rural areas, the plan recognises that the main task lies in the provision of clean drinking water to people there. This is becoming increasingly urgent in the face of water-borne diseases, which constantly threaten the rural population.

The task of providing rural areas with water involves the rehabilitation and maintenance of natural wells and boreholes. At the moment, there are over 150 powered boreholes in need of repair. The other task is the repair of an estimated 3,000 manual boreholes. Most of them no longer function, but some have been repaired by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

To ensure distribution of water to all rural people, the development plan recommends the setting up of rural communities centred on water sources. There are 62 rural locations throughout the country which have been earmarked for water supply under this proposed arrangement.

As a first step, the Ministry of Culture and Community Development will take a census of all water resources, including wells and springs. It is estimated that the country has over 10,000 springs and wells that are potentially useful to the rural population. These have to be maintained and improved. The success of the project will depend on the response of the international community, which is expected to finance the programme. If Uganda has to draw on her own resources, the project will take more than one decade ●

DIVERSIFYING EXPORTS TO REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON COFFEE

Kampala UGANDA TIMES in English 18 Nov 83 p 3

[Article by J. Ochieng]

[Text] The government is now studying various areas of diversifying exports in order to reduce dependency on coffee in earning foreign exchange.

The minister of commerce, Mr. Aliro Omara, told directors of a London-based firm, Matth Verdegaaal, UK dealing in horticultural crops that grants had been given to finance projects for diversifying the export sector "Horticultural production is among the projects", he said.

He added that an act had been passed by the parliament for the establishment of an Export Promotion Council Local sta[letters illegible] will be trained in the field of export.

Mr. Omara said that other measures include strict surveillance to ensure that commodities were not smuggled to the neighbouring states.

The leader of the team Mr. John Whitechurch said they had come to find possibilities of entering into joint ventures with Ugandans in growing vegetables, fruits, flowers and other horticultural crops for export. 'This venture has a big potential in Uganda. It succeeded in neighbouring Kenya', he said.

He added that there were funds available in the UNDP which for such projects. "We shall consider establishing a packing and cooling station in Uganda. It is most likely to be sited in Kabale where the climate is favourable. The products will then be transported to the airport", for export, Mr. Whitechurch said.

He suggested that there should be a packing and grading centre in Kampala to handle pawpaws, pineapples, mangoes, sweet bananas which had a big market outside.

'We are willint to assist in this endeavour," he said.

The managing director of Standard Distributors (U) Ltd., Mr. S. J. Batums, said the visiting enterprernuers were prepared to send seedlings of various horttural crops here.

He added that horticultural farmers lacked seeds and the enterprenuers' assistance would help in boosting the output.

The enterprenuers were invited here by Standard Distributors ((U) Ltd., which is engaged in the growing of horticultural crops.

CSO: 3400/431

AFP VIEWS COUNTRY'S 'DETERIORATING' ECONOMIC SITUATION

AB110950 Paris AFP in English 0929 GMT 11 Dec 83

[By Philippe Mudry]

[Text] Ouagadougou, 11 December (AFP)--Upper Volta's radical new leadership is trying to turn around the crippled economy of this West African state, by convincing businessmen that market economy and populist revolution are not incompatible.

The National Revolutionary Council [CNR], headed by Captain Thomas Sankara, inherited an extremely worrying economic situation when it took power last August. According to business circles the economy had been deteriorating since 1980 in Upper Volta, one of the poorest countries in the world with an output per capita of just 210 dollars last year.

The country is scarcely equipped to face up to this situation. Landlocked, 90 percent rural and without significant mineral wealth, its foreign trade shows an all but unavoidable deficit--more than 125 million dollars in 1982--which wage transfers from citizens working abroad, notably in neighbouring Ivory Coast, cannot make up. In addition, the state does not have the necessary resources to develop the country because of drop in tax revenue. This year again it will be unable to balance its budget, in spite of French and Algerian loans amounting to 1.4 million dollars. Another loan, of unspecified size, is currently being negotiated with the international monetary fund, an informed source said here.

A result of these loans is a spectacular rise in the amount needed to service the foreign debt, which has trebled in 4 years, the source said. It will reach 3.2 million dollars in 1984, and the next budget currently being drawn up will be 10 percent larger, aiming to balance revenue and expenditure at around 145 million dollars.

For businesses the fall in economic activity has brought dismissals and lay-offs, as well as a sharp deterioration in their financial position. The state is partly blamed because of its debts to various companies, which business circles say had scarcely been reduced from the 12.5 million dollars of last February.

The banking system is also in a crisis, illustrated by the virtual bankruptcy of the national development bank, which plays a central role in the economy. The press recently reported that unrecovered debts to the banks stand at 15 million dollars, a considerable sum in Upper Volta terms.

"The arrival in power of the CNR has resolved nothing," one economic expert said here. Business circles, hit by government campaigns against "profiteers" of earlier regimes, populist measures and above all the extensive purge of civil servants and the nomination of young and inexperienced people to key posts in the economy, "think it prudent to wait and see how things develop," he added.

The figures speak for themselves, informed sources said. Between September 1982 and September 1983 imports fell by 50 percent. But the authorities, conscious of the effect of this phenomenon on their tax revenue, have been quick to woo business circles, stressing repeatedly that there is no question of a centralised economy and that the private sector has its place in the revolution.

Finance Minister Damo Justin Barro has been holding "explanatory" meetings with the private sector, and a campaign to mobilise traders is under way, backed up by banners and mass gatherings.

An interministerial committee is also considering ways to stimulate the economy. Steps being studied include easing regulations, notably fiscal ones.

"The attitude of business circles, particularly traders, will be decisive," said a government source who denied any idea of "radicalisation." The slight increase in imports in October is viewed as encouraging, even if it is still difficult to say whether it is a fundamental move or simply the replenishing of stocks.

CSO: 3400/477

ZNUT BRANCH ACCUSES LABOR MINISTRY OF CAUSING CONFUSION

Lusaka DAILY MAIL in English 14 Dec 83 p 3

[Text] THE Zambia National Union of Teachers (ZNUT) Chingola branch has accused the Ministry of Labour and Social Services of causing confusion on the implementation of the ten per cent wage increase in the civil service.

ZNUT branch secretary, Mr Abson Simfukwe charged yesterday that civil servants were now in the dark as to whether they will get the ten per cent wage rise or not because of confusing and contradicting statements from the Ministry of Labour.

He was reacting to a statement by Minister of Labour and Social Services Mr Fredrick Hapunda last week that unions under the public sector were free to enter into negotiations with their respective employers within the frame-work of the prices and incomes guidelines on the ten per cent wage ceiling.

Mr Hapunda said this when he met representatives of the Civil Servants Union of Zambia, Zambia National Union of Teachers, Zambia United Local Authorities Workers Union and the National Union of Public Service Workers.

The Minister told the representatives of the four unions who wanted to know whether public service workers would benefit from the ten per cent wage ceiling that an earlier that not all workers would benefit from the ten per cent increase did not mean that he was not in favour of civil servants benefiting.

But reacting to Mr Hapunda's remarks, Mr Simfukwe said he did not understand what the minister meant by asking unions to open fresh negotiations with employers when trade union representatives attended talks on the same subject at State House.

"It is not logical for ZNUT to open fresh negotiations with our employers because our union representatives attended the talks chaired by President Kaunda at State House. All we want now is to be given what is due to us immediately," Mr Simfukwe stressed.

He said Mr Hapunda at first said civil servants would not benefit from the ten per cent wage ceiling and only last week was saying something else, adding that this was what was creating confusion.

Mr Simfukwe said teachers in Chingola wanted the ten per cent wage rise because they had already been represented at State House talks by their ZNUT trade unionists and did not see why fresh negotiations should be started again.

"How does ZNUT negotiate on the matter that was already sorted out at high level talks? We are peaceful citizens and we don't want trouble to begin from teachers," he said.

He said members in his district did not even want to be tempted into arguments as the issue at hand was straight-forward and all what teachers wanted was a clear statement from the government to break the impasse.

CSO: 3400/422

MUTALE SAYS GOVERNMENT SHOULD STRESS GROWING GROUP OF INDIGENOUS CROPS

Lusaka DAILY MAIL in English 14 Dec 83 p 5

[Text]

THE Party and its Government should not only emphasise maize and wheat growing but should also encourage the growing of other indigenous crops such as sorghum, millet and cassava.

Chairman of the Composite Flour Programme, a committee of agriculturists under the sponsorship of the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)/Government, Mr Phidellis Chanda Mutale, said that the Government should emphasise on the growing of indigenous crops because they can be virtually grown by every Zambian peasant farmer without much need for technical know-how.

Speaking in an interview, Mr Mutale, who is

also mill manager for Northern Milling called on the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to stop issuing further licences to maize millers because the country has enough maize mills while there were no millers for sorghum, millet and cassava.

Mr Mutale said sorghum, millet and cassava can grow anywhere in the country despite there being low rainfall or heavy rainfall.

He said these crops once fully grown could save the country a lot of foreign exchange in a reduction in the importation of wheat as well as maize.

"We can use up to 30 to 40 per cent of sorghum in wheat which would mean we would need to import less wheat. Just like we can supplement maize with sorghum in stockfeed," he said.

Mr Mutale said these indi-

genous crops which have been grown by Zambians for a long time require less technology and low inputs, which have become very expensive for the peasant farmer.

He said at the moment, the country was spending a lot of money on the growing of maize and wheat which is being brought into the country in form of aid. He added that if the country diversified extensively to these indigenous crops, it would require less aid to achieve maximum output.

"This allows every Zambian to participate because every village can grow these crops whereas there are complications in maize and wheat because these depend heavily on the weather, climate and a lot of inputs such as fertiliser and irrigation," he said.

He said at the moment, because of the emphasis on maize production, which in fact when produced is not enough, besides feeding the people, it has to be used for stockfeed, bottled and opaque beer and various other products.

Mr Mutale said previously,

bottled and opaque beer were produced by using sorghum, which can also be used for stockfeed.

He said if maize was supplemented by sorghum, there would be no need to import more maize and above all, the life of the peasant farmers in the villages would be uplifted from the sale of indigenous crops while with maize they are doubtful all the time about the weather. "With these indigenous crops, the farmer does not have to wait for fertiliser."

Mr Mutale said the capacity for maize milling in the country was more than the maize produced as well as imported.

"We have to utilise the present capacity because at the moment some maize mills are partially closed because there is no maize to go round and they cannot run for 24 hours," he said.

He said the Ministry of Commerce should encourage millers to set up sorghum, millet and cassava mills. He added that these mills when set up should initially run alongside the existing mills.

CSO: 3400/422

CONSUMERS SEEK REVOCATION OF ROP PRODUCTS' PRICE INCREASES

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 15 Dec 83 p 2

[Text] ZAMBIAN consumers have called for an immediate revocation of the increased prices of ROP products such as cooking oil and soap.

Making the call in Lusaka yesterday, chairman of the Consumers Protective Association of Zambia (CPAZ) Mr Ngenda Sipalo described the price rises announced by an Indeco spokesman as "sheer exploitation of the worst order."

The increases, effective from last Monday, indicated that a five-litre tin of cooking oil has gone up by 42.2 percent now selling at K14.15 instead of K9.85.

The spokesman said the price hike on cooking oil had been necessitated by high production costs and the handling and distribution charges of the Zambia National Wholesale and Marketing Company (ZNWMC).

Other ROP products whose increased prices met with extreme indignation from the consumers were edible fats like Spring Packets and Buttercup, detergents, toilet and hard soaps, toothpaste and shampoos.

The Times of Zambia came up with a strongly-worded opinion that did in no way support the reasons advanced by Indeco in its attempt to justify the rates.

Yesterday Mr Sipalo came into the Times of Zambia office in Lusaka to disown the price hikes and said: "We strongly feel that Indeco must revoke these prices."

The new prices were "untimely and inopportune" considering that the national budget was almost a month away and Christmas was round the corner.

Of the reasons advanced by Indeco that prices were hiked because ZNWMC was meeting handling charges for distributing ROP products, Mr Sipalo said this was completely uncalled for.

If this was the case then ROP must resume distributing its goods instead of passing the burden on to innocent consumers.

"The price increases are very unfair. We are intending to see the Minister of Commerce and Industry about it. We are holding a seminar this weekend to review the whole matter," Mr Sipalo said.

He urged the Government to get rid of black marketeering. With the present price increases unscrupulous traders would hike their prices.

That way, Mr Sipalo said, the common man would suffer the injustices of black marketeers as he would be forced to buy from them.

CSO: 3400/422

ZAMBIA

ANGOLAN REFUGEES BEING AIRLIFTED FROM NDOLA AIRPORT TO LUANDA

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 13 Dec 83 p 1

[Text] THE Angolan government has put aside two special planes for the repatriation of more than 600 refugees who entered Zambia through the North-Western Province three weeks ago following renewed political upheaval in that country.

The refugees are being airlifted from the Ndola airport to Luanda.

The exercise which started at the weekend is being supervised by officials from the Angolan embassy in Lusaka, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Zambian security officers.

Part of the Ndola airport was sealed off as the officials conducted a roll-call of the refugees.

The refugees most of them women and children were taken to the airport from Maheba refugee camp in Solwezi in hired United Bus Company of Zambia (UBZ) buses and troop carriers.

All the officials involved in the exercise were tightlipped as they were under instructions not to talk to the Press.

An Angolan embassy official told security officers to order a Times of Zambia reporter who had gone to make inquiries about the manoeuvre out of the airport area.

Sources at the airport said some of the refugees were flown out on Sunday and others left by road through Jimbe border post in Mwinilunga district.

On Wednesday, North-Western Province provincial political secretary Mr Dusken Kakompe confirmed that the refugees were being repatriated.

Mr Kakompe said arrangements for the repatriation had been made during a meeting of officials from the Angolan embassy, the UNHCR and Zambian Government.

CSO: 3400/422

KAMANGA CHARGES LDS HAS FAILED TO DELIVER SERVICES TO FARMERS

Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 15 Dec 83 p 1

[Excerpt] THE land development services (LDS) and the tractor mechanisation unit of the Government have failed to deliver services to farmers, Central Committee Member Mr Reuben Kamanga has said.

Mr Kamanga, who is Chairman of the Rural Development Sub-Committee, said in Kitwe yesterday the two units had become a disappointment since their inception and called for their reorganisation to improve performance.

Although they were important to the agricultural industry, they had failed to meet farmers' demands.

Mr Kamanga said he had already drawn the attention of Agriculture and Water Development Minister Mr Unia Mwila to this problem.

He told newsmen in Kitwe after touring a council farm on Tuesday there had been serious delays in providing land development services to farmers resulting in most of them waiting for long periods to develop their land.

Mr Kamanga urged farmers still waiting for tractor services to use oxen to avoid delays because some types of imported tractors were not suitable for Zambian conditions.

A considerable number of them had broken down and this had made the tractor mechanisation unit's services unreliable.

As a result some farmers were withdrawing money they had paid for tractor services especially in Luamshya, after discovering that the machines would not be forthcoming.

"I do not want to say much on tractors we have brought in, but the tractors have not done well because of a high rate of breakdowns, as a result a serious shortage of tractors had been created.

Mr Kamanga was happy that farmers in Zambia had not complained about lack of inputs.

"We have no complains over inputs because we have enough fertiliser and seeds."

The Central Committee member was impressed by Kitwe council's efforts to establish one of the largest mixed-farming projects in the country.

"If all district councils take their responsibilities in this direction seriously, I don't see why they cannot start making profits to supplement the cost of services to their communities."

Kitwe council commercial manager Mr Oswald Katakwe told Mr Kamanga the council had already paid 90 per cent of the K150,000 for the farm from the Rural Development Corporation and had now brought in 869 head of beef cattle.

The farm's poultry department was being expanded.

Later in Chingola, Mr Kamanga said the Party may set up a State farm in each of the country's district as a way of encouraging local people to produce more food, reports Zana.

He said this when he visited a 20-hectare maize farm belonging to Chingola district council.

He spoke after acting Chingola district governor, Mr David Masupa, observed that State farms should be decentralised "to district level so that struggling farmers may copy modern farming methods from them".

Mr Kamanga said the idea of a State farm for every district was good but would, however, depend on how successful those being set up in all provinces would be.

CSO: 3400/422

SIDO TO HELP BUSINESSMEN OBTAIN COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS

Lusaka DAILY MAIL in English 13 Dec 83 p 7

[Text] THE SMALL Industries Development Organisation (SIDO) has pledged to help Zambian businessmen obtain loans from commercial banks for setting up manufacturing industries.

SIDO director and chief executive, Dr Chilelebwe Ng'andwe said in Solwezi yesterday that SIDO would assist any small-scale entrepreneur whose projects proved economic and financially viable.

Dr Ng'andwe was addressing heads of government departments, parastatals and councillors in the Boma conference hall.

The SIDO chief said his organisation would approach the Bank of Zambia to change the loan security demands by commercial banks.

"We want banks to look at the viability of the project as security and not assets."

He explained that his organisation would only consider to assist those industries whose products were in line with the national aspirations.

He said for example that SIDO would like more hammer mills established in villages to discourage people trekking to towns to buy mealie-meal.

SIDO would also encourage the establishment of industries in wood, leather and processing of agricultural produce.

Dr Ng'andwe said SIDO would also like to see district councils assume total responsibility in organising physical structures where industries should be established.

He added that the organisation would conduct seminars, workshops and training courses for small-scale industrialists in villages as well as in towns.--Zana.

CSO: 3400/422

MINISTER INSPECTS RESTRUCTURING EXERCISE

MB051515 Harare Domestic Service in English 1115 GMT 5 Jan 84

[Text] The chairman of the ZANU-PF Mashonaland West Province, Comrade Nathan Shamuyarira, this morning completed a tour of four wards of the Kariba District. The purpose of the visit was to see how the party's restructuring exercise has gone, and to have firsthand information on development projects in the area. Comrade Shamuyarira, who is the minister of information, posts, and telecommunications, visited (Msamba Karume) and (Siakobo), where he met local chiefs and ZANU-PF leaders.

Among the issues highlighted by local leaders for the government to look into, were the shortage of high price of mealie meal, the building of schools, the construction of roads, and sinking boreholes.

Comrade Shamuyarira called on the Tonga people to start building brick houses which, he said, would make it easier for the government to assist the people in electrification and water projects. The minister expressed satisfaction at the way the restructuring exercise was conducted. However, he expressed concern at the lack of interministerial coordination at the implementation stage of development projects. He cited the case of three clinics in the (Nyaminyami) Council, which have been completed but are not functioning because of lack of water and personnel. Comrade Shamuyarira pointed out that some of the equipment sent to assist in rural development had broken down because of poor supervision at implementation level.

CSO: 3400/479

BRIEFS

SPLINTER UNIONS URGED TO MERGE--The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions [ZCTU] has again called on splinter unions to merge to form a single trade union for each industry. According to the ZCTU publicity and information secretary, Comrade (Elfidio Zvobgo), no splinter union will be allowed to attend the organization's congress to be held later this year. Comrade (Zvobgo) said the splinter unions will be called to discuss their differences, and if no agreement is reached the ZCTU will take control of the unions until the differences are resolved. [Text] [MB080730 Harare Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 8 Jan 84]

YOUTH, WOMEN'S CONGRESSES OPEN--The ZANU-PF Manicaland Provincial Youth and Women's League Congresses began in Mutare this morning. The congresses were officially opened by the deputy prime minister, Comrade Simon Muzenda, who told the delegates that ZANU-PF is the custodian of the wishes and aspirations of the majority, of which the youth and women form a large part. Comrade Muzenda said the government attaches great importance to the role of youth and women in the development of Zimbabwe, as evidenced by the creation of the Ministries of Youth, Sport and Culture and Community Development and Women's Affairs. He said the ZANU-PF Central Committee is anxiously watching the development of the Youth and Women's League, which formed the backbone of the liberation struggle and are the spearhead in the establishment of socialism in Zimbabwe. The deputy prime minister reminded the delegates that the provincial congresses are in preparation for three national congresses to be held this year. He therefore urged them to choose leaders who are immune to the vices of corruption, sectionalism, arrogance and opportunism. The ZANU-PF Central Committee has declared the following dates for the national congresses: 15 to 18 March, National Council for Women's League Congress; 24 to 27 May, Youth League Congress; and 8 to 12 August, National People's Congress. [Text] [MB071254 Harare Domestic Service in English 1115 GMT 7 Jan 84]

CSO: 3400/486

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